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I.

INTRODUCTION

Across the country' and in Wyoming2 juries have been returning
1. E.g., Conlan v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 82852 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 10, 1987)
(awarding sixty million dollars to plaintiffs; settled while pending appeal, on confidential terms); K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming
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large verdicts in favor of borrowers and against lenders in so-called
"lender liability" cases. To borrowers, such verdicts represent a long
overdue balancing of power between borrowers driven to bankruptcy
and ruin by the whim and caprice of powerful lenders. To lenders,
such verdicts are an assault on legitimate banking practices which
threatens, in the long run, to undermine the system and eliminate the
availability of financing to worthy borrowers. The truth lies somewhere in between. The development of lender liability represents a
realignment of legal rights and responsibilities to conform with contemporary business practices in which lenders have become much
more than mere providers of funds.
The phrase "lender liability" was virtually unknown ten years
ago, although lenders have long been held accountable to borrowers
for tortss and breaches of contract." Lender liability is, therefore, not
some new cause of action. It is, instead, a catchall phrase that refers
to an array of tort and contract claims asserted against lenders by
distressed borrowers. The causes of action are not, for the most part,
new. What is new is the assertion of traditional, as well as more recently developed tort and contract causes of action in cases brought
by borrowers against lenders. Whatever the bases for recovery, there
has been a dramatic increase in lender liability litigation across the
country and in Wyoming.
Not surprisingly, the upsurge in lender liability cases has begun
to generate a body of literature, intended both to analyze the phenomenon and to assist practitioners in prosecuting and defending
such cases. There are, as a result, several excellent treatises on the
development of theories of recovery and the avoidance of lender liability.5 There are also at least two loose-leaf services devoted solely to
jury verdict of $7.5 million); Kruse/Jewell v. Bank of America, No. 112439 (Cal. Super.
Ct. July 14, 1985) (awarding $20 million in compensatory damages and $27 million in
punitive damages to a family of apple growers), rev'd, 202 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 38, 248
Cal. Rptr. 217 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 870 (1989); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah
Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming jury verdict of over $20
million).
2. Puryear v. Wyoming Prod. Credit Ass'n, No. C88-1012-B (D. Wyo. Nov. 22,
1988), aff'd, No. 89-8019 (10th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied [hereinafter Puryear (No. C881012-B)] (awarding $408,000 in favor of rancher for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent advising and negligent misrepresentation); Meyers v. Travelers, Inc., Civ. No. 10147 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. Sept. 24, 1987)
[hereinafter Meyers (No. 10147)] (awarding $3.2 million in compensatory damages in
favor of ranching family, case settled on confidential terms before the jury considered
punitive damages).
The author was one of the attorneys for the plaintiff in the Puryear case.
3. One author has determined that the first reported case involving a fiduciary
relationship between a lender and a borrower is M.L. Steward & Co. v. Marcus, 124
Misc. 86, 207 N.Y.S. 685 (1924). Cappello, Fiduciary Relationships Between Lenders
and Borrowers: Maintenance of the Status Quo, 15 WESTERN ST. UL. REV. 579, n.4
(1988).
4. A. CAPPELLO & F. KOMOROSKE, LENDER LIABILrrv 124 (1987) [hereinafter A.
CAPPELLO].
5. See, e.g., G. BLANCHARD, LENDER LIABILITY: LAW, PRACTICE AND PREVENTION
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lender liability issues.6 The treatises and services are national in
scope, although they tend to rely heavily on California decisions.
Lender liability, however, is almost exclusively a creature of state tort
and contract law. Accordingly, while treatises and loose-leaf services
are valuable, their usefulness is necessarily limited in any particular
jurisdiction.7 There is a growing body of literature, of which this article is a part, dedicated exclusively to lender liability in specific states.8
The Wyoming Supreme Court in recent years has addressed a
number of lender liability issues, either directly or tangentially. Some
of those decisions are in accord with the general trend of lender liability law across the country. Some are not. In addition, many lender
liability issues have yet to be considered by the court. A review of the
court's recent opinions shows the emergence of a fairly clearly defined
view of the relative rights and responsibilities of borrowers and lenders. It also provides some indication of how the law of lender liability
may be expected to develop in Wyoming.
This article discusses the emerging framework of lender liability
law in Wyoming with respect to commercial lending. 9 It catalogues
and analyzes the causes of action which plaintiffs have asserted in attempting to recover from lenders, the relative advantages and disadvantages of those causes of action and the defenses potentially available to lenders, including preventive actions to avoid lender liability
cases altogether.
11.

CONTRACT VERSUS TORT CLAIMS

Lender liability cases generally present an amalgam of contract
and tort claims arising out of the same set of facts. Therefore, they
inevitably raise questions about the respective roles of contract and
.(1989); A. BLOOM, LENDER LIABILITY: PRACTICE AND PREVENTION (1989) [hereinafter A.
BLOOM]; A. CAPPELLO, supra note 4; H. CHAITMAN, THE LAW OF LENDER LIABILITY
(1990).
6. Lender Liability Law Report, published monthly by Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc., and Lender Liability News, published biweekly by Buraff Publications, a
division of The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.

7. For example, one of the treatises advises the reader that "there is a great deal
of variation among the states" regarding defamation and "the practitioner should carefully examine the law ... of the relevant jurisdiction." A. CAPPELLO, supra note 4, at
215.
8. See, e.g., Rossi, Lender Liability in Kansas: A Paradigm of Competing Tort
and Contract Theories, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 495 (1990); Note, Good Faith in Arizona
Lender Liability Actions, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 729 (1989); Williamson & Tanner, Lender
Liability in Mississippi: A Survey, Comparison and Comment, 57 Miss. L.J. 1 (1987).

9. A lender has special obligations regarding consumer loans as a result of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), WYo. STAT. §§ 40-14-101 to -702 (1977) and
the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1988).
Whether a loan is a consumer loan must be determined by referring to the statutory definitions of consumer loan and by the specific facts of the case. Anderson v.
Foothill Indus. Bank, 674 P.2d 232, 235-36 (Wyo. 1984). A discussion of the disclosure
and other requirements of the UCCC and the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act
is beyond the scope of this article.
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tort theories of recovery.
By definition, a borrower and a lender have entered into a contractual relationship in which the lender has agreed to lend money to
the borrower, who has agreed to repay the money on certain terms
and conditions. Almost invariably, the agreement is reduced, at least
in part, to writing.' Consequently, the duties of the parties have traditionally been established by the terms of the written documents.
Since the parol evidence rule precludes the admission of extraneous
evidence which contradicts or alters a written agreement," neither
borrowers nor lenders were able to recover for the breach of an unwritten understanding. Recovery was generally based on, and limited
to, an action for breach of the provisions of the written documents.
Tort actions depend on the existence of a duty. That duty may be
imposed by law or by contract. 2 The distinction between tort and
contract duty with respect to the parties to the contract has become
increasingly confused and complicated. Contracts are "obligations
Generally, the
based on the manifested intention of the parties .... ,,13
breach of such intentions gives rise only to contract liability; there are
instances, however, where the breach of a contractual obligation may
result in tort liability. 4
Since tort actions present potentially significant advantages over
contract theories, borrowers have had a strong incentive to convert
lender liability actions into tort actions.' Perhaps the most significant
development of lender liability law is how courts, including the Wyoming Supreme Court, have recognized a wide variety of tort claims in
an arena where the relationship between the parties continues to be,
at least ostensibly, controlled by contract.

10. If the loan is unsecured, there is often only one document-a promissory note.
If the loan is secured, there must also be some sort of security agreement. While the
note and security agreement are often the only documents, the parties' agreement may
include other provisions. For example, a typical additional understanding, at least on
the borrower's part, is that the lender will renew the note when it comes due, provided
the borrower makes payments of interest.
11. Bethurem v. Hammett, 736 P.2d 1128, 1136-37 (Wyo. 1987). The parol evidence rule precludes the introduction of oral testimony to contradict, alter, add to, or
vary the plain terms of the writing. Id.
12. Brubaker v. Glenrock Lodge Int'l Order of Odd Fellows, 526 P.2d 52, 58 (Wyo.
1974).
13. W. KEETON,

§

D. DOBBS,

R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS

92 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter W. KEETON].
14. See infra notes 299-312 and accompanying text.
15. The primary advantage is that the plaintiff in a tort action is entitled to recover all damages proximately caused by the defendant, not just foreseeable damages
as in contract. See infra notes 334-357 and accompanying text. Also, the recovery of
punitive damages is easier in tort than in contract. See infra notes 354-357 and accompanying text.
There may be occasions when a contract action is advantageous. For example, the
statute of limitations for contract actions in Wyoming is longer than that for tort actions. See Wvo. STAT. § 1-3-105(a) (1988).
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LENDER AND BORROWER

The starting point of every potential lender liability claim is the
relationship between the borrower and the lender. That relationship
establishes the parties' respective duties. Those duties, in turn, determine when and under what circumstances the lender may become liable to the borrower and vice versa.
The relationship between a lender and a borrower may take several forms: (1) an ordinary business relationship; 6 (2) a fiduciary relationship;1 7 (3) a quasi-fiduciary relationship;' or (4) some other special relationship."9 The Wyoming Supreme Court has yet to expressly
address the nature of the relationship. As discussed below, it appears
that the Wyoming Supreme Court begins with the presumption that
the relationship is an ordinary business relationship, but is prepared
to recognize some sort of special relationship given appropriate facts.
A.

Ordinary Business Relationship

Traditionally, the relationship between a borrower and a lender
has been considered to be an ordinary business relationship, governed
by the contract between the parties,20 supplemented by the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC). The duties owed by each party to the other
were specified by and limited to the contract and the UCC. Accordingly, the breach of those contract obligations did not give rise to a
tort action as neither party owed duties to the other outside the
contract. 2'
Assuming an ordinary business relationship, an agreement to lend
money is subject to the same rules of construction and interpretation
as any other contract.22 The law in Wyoming is clear. A court will
enforce an unambiguous contract, rather than rewriting it "under the
guise of interpretation."' 3 Furthermore, in the absence of an ambiguity in the written documents themselves, it is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to preclude evidence of extraneous matters, such
as the course of dealing between the parties, which purports to prove
a different intention or agreement.2 4
16. See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 25-57 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
20. A. BLOOM, supra note 5, at 5.
21. A breach of contract may, in some instances, be tortious. See infra notes 299312 and accompanying text.
22. Compare Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431, 433 (Wyo. 1987) (setting forth rules of
contract construction) with Lawrence v. Farm Credit Sys. Capital Corp., 761 P.2d 640,
645-46 (Wyo. 1988) (applying contract construction rules to promissory notes).
23. Lawrence, 761 P.2d at 645.
24. Id. at 652-53.
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B. Fiduciary Relationship
The term "fiduciary relationship" has been applied to a wide variety of legal relationships." Although there is some inconsistency
among courts, a fiduciary relationship may be defined as a duty on the
part of one party "to act for or give advice for the benefit of another
upon matters within the scope of the relation. ' 26 Such a relationship
exists "when there is a reposing of faith, confidence and trust, and the
placing of reliance by one upon the judgment and advice of the
other. '217 The duty to act for the benefit of the other party may be
imposed by law, as in the attorney-client relationship, by express
agreement of the parties, as in a trustee-beneficiary relationship, or it
may be implied because of the nature of the relationship between the
parties."
A bank stands in a fiduciary relationship to a customer in at least
three situations. First, a bank acting as an agent for a customer owes
fiduciary duties to that customer (the principal). 9 Second, a bank
which holds funds for a specific purpose is a fiduciary. Finally, a
lender which assumes control of a borrower in the event of a default
owes fiduciary duties to that borrower, the borrower's other creditors
and the borrower's shareholders, assuming the borrower is a corporation." The question which remains, however, is under what other circumstances, if any, does a bank owe fiduciary duties to a borrower,
the breach of which will lead to lender liability.
A lender and a borrower do not generally have a fiduciary relationship.2 2 Some courts have found such a relationship when the
lender goes beyond simply providing money to the borrower and offers

25. See, e.g., Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962, 970 (5th Cir. 1970) (finding a

fiduciary relationship between an attorney and his or her client which imposes on the
attorney an obligation of "the utmost degree of honesty, forthrightness, loyalty and
fidelity" towards the client); McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 864
(Wyo. 1990) (Golden, J., dissenting) (insurer owes insured fiduciary duties); Scotti's
Drive-In Restaurant, Inc. v. Mile High-Dart, Inc., 526 P.2d 1193, 1196-97 (Wyo.
1974) (finding a trust is a fiduciary relationship).
26. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 874, comment a (1977).
27. Kurth v. Ban Horn, 380 N.W.2d 693, 695-96 (Iowa 1986) (quoting BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979)).
28. A. CAPPELLO, supra note 4, at 107. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying
text.
29. See, e.g., Janes v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 57 Ill. 2d 398, 312 N.E.2d 605,
610-11(1974) (bank which had ordered a preliminary title report and policy for a borrower was an agent of the borrower, and hence a fiduciary).
30. First Interstate Bank v. Big Horn Fed. Say. & Loan, 770 P.2d 231, 233 (Wyo.
1989) (finding a bank which is depository of Individual Retirement Account holds such
funds in a fiduciary capacity). Merely accepting "general deposits" does not, however,
make a bank a fiduciary; it simply results in a debtor-creditor relationship between the
bank and the depositor. Gray v. Elliott, 36 Wyo. 361, 365-66, 257 P. 345, 346 (1927).

31. A. CAPPELLO, supra note 4, at 107.
32. Simmons v. Jenkins, 750 P.2d 1067, 1070 (Mont. 1988); see also A.
supra note 4, at 106.1.
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advice and consultation." A lender may assume such an advisory capacity either deliberately or inadvertently, or circumstances may virtually dictate such a role. In any event, a fiduciary relationship between a lender and a borrower typically arises over an extended
course of dealing between the borrower and the lender where the borrower reasonably relies on the lender for advice and guidance. " If
such a relationship is found to exist, the bank's obligations change
dramatically. The bank is no longer free to act in its best interests,
regardless of the impact on the borrower. Instead, the bank becomes
obligated to provide advice and consultation and must refrain from
taking advantage of its position of power and influence over the
borrower.3 5
The Wyoming Supreme Court has never considered whether a fiduciary relationship can develop out of a borrower-lender relationship. Should the issue arise, the court's decision in Lawrence v. Farm
Credit System Capital Corp." suggests that the court begins with a
presumption that the relationship between a borrower and a lender is
an ordinary business
relationship and is unlikely to recognize a fiduci3 7
ary relationship.
The Lawrence family owned and operated several ranches in
Johnson County, Wyoming. Beginning in 1961, the Lawrences financed the ranches' operations through lines of credit with the Production Credit Association (PCA).3 8 The lines of credit were evidenced by promissory notes that were due annually and secured by
security agreements and real estate mortgages, which collectively en33. See, e.g., Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 213 Cal. App. 3d 927, 262 Cal.
Rptr. 260, 278 (1989), review denied; Simmons, 750 P.2d at 1070; Tokarz v. Frontier
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 33 Wash. App. 456, 460-61, 656 P.2d 1089, 1092 (1982); see
also A CAPPELLO, supra note 4, at 107-12.
34. Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188, 193 (Mont. 1984).
35. The advice required of a lender will vary depending on the nature of the borrower's business. In most instances, however, such advice will involve the financial
management and planning of the borrower's business, including such matters as
whether the borrower should expand its operation, borrow additional operating capital
or consider liquidation. In every instance, the duty to advise includes the duty to exercise reasonable care in rendering advice.
36. 761 P.2d 640 (Wyo. 1988).
37. While the decision does not foreclose a finding of a fiduciary relationship, it
appears more likely that the court will recognize a quasi-fiduciary or other special relationship. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
38. The PCA is a branch of the Farm Credit System. The Farm Credit System
(FCS) is administered by the Farm Credit Administration, an independent agency of
the United States Government. The FCS includes: "the Federal land banks, the Federal land bank associations, the Federal intermediate credit banks, the production
credit associations [PCAs] [and] the banks for cooperatives." 12 U.S.C. § 2002 (1988).
The PCAs provide short-term and intermediate-term operational financing to farmers
and ranchers. See N. HARL. AGRICULTURE LAW § 100.03[21 [a] (1990). The Farm Credit
System Capital Corporation was formed to provide financial assistance to FCS institutions, including the PCAs. Id. at § 100.0314].
In the Lawrence case, the PCA provided the original funding. The Farm Credit
System Capital Corporation subsequently purchased a participating interest in the
loans and the collateral. Lawrence, 761 P.2d at 643, n.1.
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cumbered the ranches' livestock, machinery, equipment and real
property.39
After a series of financial setbacks, including extensive livestock
losses during the blizzard of 1984, the Lawrences requested additional
funds from the PCA to replace livestock lost in the blizzard. The PCA
refused to advance additional funds."0 The Lawrences were unable to
pay the notes as they became due and defaulted. The PCA filed a
foreclosure action. 41 The Lawrences filed counterclaims, alleging both
contract and tort claims.' 2 At trial, the Lawrences sought to introduce
evidence that the PCA was experiencing serious financial difficulties,
and those difficulties had resulted in the unjust foreclosure of numerous loans, including their own."3 After refusing to permit the introduction of evidence of the PCA's financial problems, the trial court
granted a directed verdict in favor of the PCA, permitting the foreclosure to proceed and dismissing the borrower's counterclaims. 4 ' The
Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed.4 5
Writing for the majority in a four to one decision, Justice Macy
reaffirmed the traditional view that loan agreements are, as any other
contracts, to be strictly construed."6 Accordingly, if the intent of the
parties can be ascertained from "the plain and unambiguous language
of the contract," evidence to the contrary should not be admitted.4 7
Furthermore, the trial court had properly granted a directed verdict
against the Lawrences on their claims of bad faith in contract and tort
because "there is absolutely no evidence which suggests that [the
PCA] improperly manipulated the contract provisions to its benefit
and to the Lawrences' detriment. ' 48 Finally, the court upheld the trial
court's refusal to admit evidence regarding the PCA's financial difficulties. The admissibility of evidence is a matter committed to the
discretion of the trial court; such rulings will not be disturbed in the
absence of an abuse of discretion.' 9
In dissent, Justice Urbigkit upbraided the majority for its ap39. Brief for Appellant at 7, Lawrence v. Farm Credit System Capital Corp., 761
P.2d 640 (Wyo. 1988) (No. 87-168).

40. Id. at 8-9.
41. Id. at 9.
42. The Lawrences alleged that the PCA had: (1) wrongfully refused to sign
nondisturbance agreements, thereby preventing the Lawrences from obtaining alternative financing; (2) interfered with the Lawrences' obtaining a loan from the State of
Wyoming Farm Loan Board; (3) acted in bad faith in initiating the foreclosure action;
(4) intentionally harassed certain of the plaintiffs and precluded them from taking
advantage of a federal assistance program for young ranchers; and (5) breached an
agreement to advance additional funds. Lawrence, 761 P.2d at 641.
43. Id. at 653; see also Reply Brief for Appellants at 14-23, Lawrence v. Farm
Credit System Capital Corp., 761 P.2d 640 (Wyo. 1988) (No. 87-168).
44. Lawrence, 761 P.2d at 642.
45. Id. at 653.
46. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
47. Lawrence, 761 P.2d at 646.
48. Id. at 651.

49. Id. at 652.
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proval of "the moralistic and legal"" approach to lender liability. The

majority, he said, improperly focused on the one-year period of the
specific loans in question,5 1 and ignored the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. 52 The loan agreement, he wrote, was derived
from an understanding developed "through years of mutual business
association as borrower and lender."5 " It was error, therefore, to look
solely to the written documents to determine the meaning of the loan
agreement."
Although the majority in Lawrence did not directly discuss the
nature of the relationship between a lender and a borrower, the tenor
of its decision is unmistakable. A lender and a borrower have an ordinary business relationship, at least in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.55 That relationship is governed by the terms of the written
contract, which are subject to the normal rules of contract construction. That contract is, of course, subject to the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing." Similarly, the court's affirmation of the
trial court's refusal to admit evidence that the foreclosure was motivated by factors outside the relationship indicates the absence of any
non-contractual duties.
There is no higher standard which can be imposed on a lender
than that which results from a finding of a fiduciary relationship.
There is no lesser standard than that which flows from an ordinary
business relationship. The Lawrence decision is, at least arguably, a
clear indication that the Wyoming Supreme Court is unlikely to find a
fiduciary relationship between a borrower and a lender in a case involving a commercial loan. 57
C. Quasi-fiduciaryRelationship
A quasi-fiduciary relationship, as a fiduciary relationship, is not
50. Id. at 654 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 657.
52. Id. at 655-56.
53. Id. at 657.
54. Id. at 656.
55. Although the Lawrences argued that the PCA had an obligation to lend them
additional funds and continue financing the ranching operation, they did not argue
that those duties resulted from a fiduciary relationship, a quasi-fiduciary relationship
or any other special relationship. Id. at 651-52 (Macy, J., writing for the majority).
56. See infra notes 121-130 and accompanying text.
57. It can be argued that the Lawrence case means nothing of the sort because
there was no evidence of any kind of relationship of trust and confidence between the
parties which had been breached by the PCA. While that argument has merit, it seems
unlikely that the court will leap from the Lawrence case to find a fiduciary relationship in a commercial lender liability case. The more likely scenario is that the court
will, given appropriate facts, recognize a quasi-fiduciary or other special relationship.
In Meyers (No. 10147), the trial court allowed the question of whether there was a
fiduciary relationship between the lender and the borrower to go to the jury. The jury
found such a relationship. The case was settled prior to appeal, and the issue was not
brought before the Wyoming Supreme Court.
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inherently part of a borrower-lender relationship.58 It, too, arises only
where a lender goes beyond the role of simply providing financing and
becomes an advisor."9 The distinction, if any, between a fiduciary and
a quasi-fiduciary relationship is unclear. They arise in similar circumstances, and appear to impose similar duties on the lender. The quasifiduciary classification may have been created to impose liability on a
lender that has assumed a role other than or in addition to the role of
providing funds, but to avoid imposing the full panoply of obligations
which come with a fiduciary relationship.60
D.

Special Relationship

At least one court has also referred to a "special relationship" between the borrower and the lender which arises when the borrower is
"relying upon the superior specialized knowledge and experience" of
the lender and the lender has knowledge of a material fact not easily
discoverable by the borrower. 1 Whether such a "special relationship"
may arise in other circumstances is uncertain.
There is some indication that a special relationship may arise because of the nature of the lender's business. That is, when a lender
engages in financing a particular type of business, which requires the
lender to possess some particular expertise, the lender may have a
special relationship with the borrower. 2 Which areas of lending require particularized knowledge is unclear. There are areas of lending
where lenders typically become intimately involved in borrowers' businesses and some higher standard of care ought to apply. For example,
a lender which specializes in financing real estate developments must
develop sufficient expertise to know whether the development is being
done in accordance with applicable zoning regulations and building
codes or risk losing the loan. Accordingly, the lender is almost compelled to become significantly involved in the developer's business. Ultimately, whether a higher standard exists because of such involvement will be determined and limited by expert testimony.
58. Hutson v. Wenatchee Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Wash. App. 91, 103-06, 588
P.2d 1192, 1199-1200 (1978).
59. Id.
60. Imposing fiduciary duties on a lender essentially puts the lender in the position of a trustee that must act solely in the best interests of the beneficiary. By creating a "quasi-fiduciary" or other special relationship a court can impose a duty to re-

frain from taking action detrimental to a borrower, but avoid imposing all the

affirmative obligations of a fiduciary.
61. Favors v. Matzke, 53 Wash. App. 789, 770 P.2d 686, 690 (1989).
62. Agricultural lending is a specialized area of lending, requiring expertise in
both lending and agriculture. Puryear v. Wyoming Prod. Credit Ass'n, No. C88-1012-B
(D. Wyo. Feb. 13, 1989) (Order on Motion to Correct, Alter or Amend and Order on
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial) at 10-11 [hereinafter

Order on Motion to Amend, Puryear]. Accordingly, agricultural lenders owe a "special

duty" to their borrowers, including the duty of rendering sound advice. The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 also provides additional rights and remedies to members/borrowers of the Farm Credit System. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2202(a)-(d) (1988).
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If the distinction between fiduciary and quasi-fiduciary relationships is unclear, the distinction between quasi-fiduciary and other
special relationships is even murkier. The difference may be nothing
more than semantics. Regardless of the name, however, there are occasions when a lender does much more than simply provide funds.
When that happens, there is likely some relationship other than a
simple business relationship which imposes additional duties on the
lender. Those duties, in turn, result in potential tort liability if not
properly discharged.
E.

Establishing the Relationship

The existence of a fiduciary, quasi-fiduciary or other special relationship will often be the critical issue in a lender liability case. The
reason is simple. If there is nothing more than an ordinary business
relationship, the parties' rights and responsibilities will be governed
by the loan agreement and the Uniform Commercial Code. In all likelihood, the lender will be free to choose and pursue its remedies in the
event of default. 63 The borrower's potential claims will be restricted to
showing a breach of the contract 6 ' or that the lender has violated the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. If there is some special relationship, 5 however, the imposition of additional duties on the
lender gives the borrower a variety of potential tort claims if the
lender breaches any of those duties.
Courts have considered several factors indicative of some special
relationship: (1) the lender has assumed some obligation;" (2) the
lender has become involved in the operation of the borrower's business;6 7 (3) the borrower is unsophisticated in financial matters; 68 or (4)
the borrower is involved in a business with a special nature.6 9 While
the Wyoming Supreme Court has yet to expressly recognize a special
relationship in a lender liability case, it has held that two of the listed
7
70
factors, the assumption of a duty and the borrower's sophistication, '
may alter a party's obligations. It seems reasonably likely, therefore,
that the court would recognize a special relationship in a lender liability case, albeit not a fiduciary relationship, given appropriate facts.

63. Foothill Indus. Bank v. Mikkelson, 623 P.2d 748, 755-56 (Wyo. 1981).
64. A breach of contract may be tortious. See infra notes 299-312 and accompanying text.
65. The term "special relationship" is used hereinafter to refer to anything other
than an ordinary business relationship, including a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary
relationship.
66. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 83, 85 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
71. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
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1. Lender's Assumption of Duty
It has long been the law that one who voluntarily undertakes to
perform a duty must discharge that duty in a reasonable, prudent
manner.7 2' The Wyoming Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that
principle in a case involving a realtor who gratuitously advised a
friend.78 By volunteering advice, the realtor became subject to liability
for failing to exercise reasonable care and for failing to 7exercise
"the
4
high degree of care expected of a real estate salesman.
While the court has yet to consider the applicability of that principle in a lender liability case, courts in other jurisdictions have not
hesitated to apply the traditional rule. 5 In addition, an argument that
a lender who gratuitously offers advice should be held to a lower standard of care than a realtor is strained, at best. Accordingly, there is
every reason to expect that the Wyoming Supreme Court would extend the rule to require a lender that advises a borrower on financial
or business matters to be held to the high degree of care expected of a
banker.
2.

Involvement in Borrower's Business

Lenders must walk a fine line. On the one hand, it is poor banking practice not to keep a close watch on a borrower's business operations. On the other hand, any attempt by the lender to become involved in that business and thereby protect its loan may give rise to
liability.78 State National Bank v. Farah Manufacturing Co. is the
seminal case in this area.77
In Farah, a consortium of lenders provided financing for a large
clothing manufacturer, the Farah Manufacturing Co. The loan agreement entered into by the lenders and Farah included a "management
change clause," pursuant to which certain changes in top management
would constitute a default. 7 The management change clause inevitably involved the lenders in Farah's business operations, altering the
parties' relationship and extending the lenders' potential liability.
The lenders used the management change clause to ensure the
election of a particular slate of candidates to the board of directors,
which then, acting upon the desire of the lenders, prevented the reinstatement of the former chief executive officer of the Company., A

72. Ellsworth Bros. Inc. v. Crook, 406 P.2d 520, 524 (Wyo. 1965).
73. Kelly v. Roussalis, 776 P.2d 1016, 1019 (Wyo. 1989).
74. Id. at 1019.
75. Production Credit Ass'n v. Vodak, 150 Wis. 2d 294, 441 N.W.2d 338, 344 (Ct.
App. 1989); Tokarz, 656 P.2d at 1092-93.
76. State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 667.
79. Id. at 668.
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jury found that such interference went beyond the scope of the management change clause and constituted an inappropriate involvement
a verdict of over $20
in the borrower's business. The jury returned
million, which was affirmed on appeal.80
The lenders' error in Farahwas not insisting on the management
clause, but using that clause to control the Company's top management. " Had the lenders confined themselves to declaring a default in
the event of a change of management, as the clause provided, they
would have been within their rights. By insisting on the management
change clause, however, the lenders inevitably became more involved
in the borrower's business. That involvement transformed their relationship with the borrower into something far different than the traditional role of providing financing. That transformation led to additional duties and, ultimately, to liability for breach of those duties.
Given the Wyoming Supreme Court's willingness to enforce written loan agreements, it is reasonably certain that the court would have
no difficulty upholding a management change clause or similar provision in a loan agreement. It seems clear, nevertheless, that such a provision fundamentally alters the borrower-lender relationship and imposes additional duties on the lender, the violation of which broadens
the potential scope of liability."2
3.

The Borrower's Financial Sophistication

Borrowers are not fungible. Each has a different level of intelligence, experience and financial sophistication. A lender must take
those differences into account in determining whether to make a loan
at all, 83 and ignores those differences at its peril in the event of a default or other problem with the loan.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has not addressed whether a borrower's lack of experience and sophistication creates a special relationship with a lender and thereby imposes additional duties. The
court has held, however, that an experienced, sophisticated borrower
may not reasonably rely on informal actions by bank officers where
8 4
the borrower has specific knowledge of the bank's lending practices.
Having held that a borrower's sophistication and experience are relevant to determining the borrower's rights and obligations, it would be
incongruous for the court to disregard a borrower's lack of financial
80. Id. at 669.
81. Id. at 688-90.
82. Such involvement may also give rise to a claim for intentional interference
with contract or prospective advantage. See infra notes 240-258 and accompanying
text.
83. Lenders typically consider the five "Cs" in deciding whether to lend money:
the borrower's character, capacity, capital, collateral and the conditions on which the
loan is to be made.
84. Roth v. First Sec. Bank, 684 P.2d 93, 97 (Wyo. 1984).
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sophistication in determining the lender's rights and obligations.
A lender which lends money knowing of a borrower's lack of sophistication and that the borrower is relying on the lender for guidance has probably entered into a special relationship with that borrower, and should proceed accordingly. The special relationship may
require the lender to offer advice, when appropriate, and it ought to
preclude the lender from taking advantage of the borrower's lack of
knowledge or expertise when negotiating the terms of a loan, developing a workout plan for a problem loan or foreclosing on a defaulted
loan. Such a result would be consistent with decisions in other jurisdictions and the court's holding in Roth v. First Security Bank.8
4.

The Nature of the Borrower's Business

The nature of the borrower's business, and the lender's decision
to become involved in financing such businesses, may create a special
relationship. As discussed above,86 a lender which chooses to participate in financing agricultural operations has been held to special duties arising out of the peculiar nature of agricultural lending. Such a
rule makes sense when the nature of the business requires the lender
to become involved in the planning and operation of the business or
where lenders have traditionally become very involved in borrowers'
businesses.
In agricultural lending, for example, lenders typically become intimately involved in the ranching or farming operation. Loan officers
advise borrowers on both financial and agricultural matters.8 7 In addition, the lender is in a position to exercise substantial control over the
borrower's business. Oftentimes, the borrower must pay all income to
the operation's lender, and all expenses are paid on drafts payable
through that same lender. In addition, the lender generally has a blanket security interest which encumbers whatever the ranch or farm
produces. This permits the lender to control the operation's income
by controlling the release of collateral. By the very nature of the business, therefore, the lender is aware of and participates in the planning
and implementation of each year's farming or ranching operation. 8
Furthermore, farmers and ranchers are engaged in an extremely volatile business. A bad storm or other natural disaster can leave even the
best farmer or rancher in a precarious financial situation. The market
for cattle and crops fluctuates widely, making long-term planning difficult, if not impossible. Because of that volatility, which cannot be
avoided, agricultural borrowers are usually totally dependent on their
lenders. Without dependable operational financing, such borrowers
85. Id. at 97.
86. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
87. Brief for Appellee at 5, Puryear v. Wyoming Prod. Credit Ass'n (D. Wyo. Nov.
22, 1988) (No. C88-1012-B).
88. Id.
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cannot survive. Those lenders that choose to become involved in financing agricultural operations know of their borrowers' vulnerability
and so occupy an inherently powerful position. With that power
comes the obligation to abide by generally accepted standards for agricultural lenders-standards which impose duties beyond those of
"normal" lenders.
The pattern is not unique to agricultural lending. The key is
whether there are generally accepted standards to which a participating lender must adhere. Those standards can be established only
through expert testimony."
IV.

CONTRACT THEORIES OF RECOVERY

A borrower damaged by the actions or omissions of a lender may
recover under any one or more of several potential causes of action.
Some are based on contract principles, others on tort law. Many are
complementary. Some are inconsistent, but may be pleaded in the alternative. Although tort claims present some advantages," contract
claims remain an effective method of recovering damages from a
lender.
A. Breach of Agreement to Lend Money
An agreement to lend money is enforceable in Wyoming, whether
the agreement is written or oral.9 1 The party asserting the existence of
an agreement to lend money must prove the terms of the contract

with specificity."' Where the parties have not agreed on the principal
amount of the loan, the interest rate, the repayment schedule or the
collateral which will secure the loan, there is no enforceable agreement. 3 The absence of any one of those terms is not fatal; their collective absence is.94 Accordingly, a simple agreement to agree is
unenforceable.98
Assuming there is no written loan agreement, the course of dealing between a lender and a borrower may be relevant to whether there
is an agreement and, if so, the terms of that agreement. A course of

dealing may provide evidence of any of the requisite terms of an en89. In Puryear (No. C88-1012-B) the court permitted expert testimony that agricultural lending is specialized and that there are generally accepted standards for agricultural lenders in Wyoming. One of those standards is to give borrowers sound advice.
Order on Motion to Amend, Puryear, at 10-11.
90. See infra notes 334-362 and accompanying text.
91. Doud v. First Interstate Bank, 769 P.2d 927, 929 (Wyo. 1989). Twenty-five
states, not including Wyoming, have adopted laws that preclude borrowers from suing
lenders for breach of an oral contract to lend money. Lender Liability Gets New Life,
The Nat'l L.J., March 18, 1991, at 3, col. 1, at 32, col. 4.
92. Doud, 769 P.2d at 929.
93. Id.
94. Union State Bank v. Woell, 434 N.W.2d 712, 717 (N.D. 1989).
95. Doud, 769 P.2d at 929.
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forceable agreement. The more important question, however, is often
whether such evidence is admissible to alter or supplement the terms
of a written agreement to lend money.
As in any contract dispute, the key to the admissibility of extraneous evidence, such as testimony or the parties' course of dealing, is
whether there is an ambiguity in the written documentation. The Wyoming Supreme Court has consistently applied the general rules of
contract construction to agreements to lend money. 6 It has upheld
unambiguous, written loan agreements, despite proffered evidence of
conduct which is inconsistent with the written documents.9 7 Accordingly, evidence of course of dealing is unlikely to be admitted to contradict or alter the terms of a written agreement unless the writings
are ambiguous or silent." If there is an ambiguity or the written
agreement is incomplete, such evidence should be admitted as evidence of the terms of the agreement. 9 The inability to introduce evidence of course of dealing has diminished borrowers' chances of recovering from lenders and may preclude the trier of fact from hearing
probative evidence of the parties' understanding and agreement.
Many commercial operating loans are written on an annual basis,
with interest tied to some outside standard, such as the prime lending
rate, or adjusted annually. The principal amount of the loan is often a
specified line of credit, with the borrower free to draw on that credit
as necessary. The collateral may be realty, personalty, inventory, accounts receivable or any combination of those types of property. In
such a situation, particularly where the borrower is not financially sophisticated, it can be argued that there is more than a simple one-year
note, and that the parties have an agreement to continue financing
indefinitely. Such an argument is not dependent on the borrower's
subjective expectations. It rests, instead, on the objective conduct of
the parties in routinely renewing the operational loan.
The Wyoming Supreme Court's adherence to a rule of strictly
construing written loan documents ignores commercial reality. For example, commercial loans are generally written on a short-term basis,
but the parties have an understanding that the loan will be renewed,
rather than paid in full, when it comes due. Without such an understanding, many borrowers would never go into business in the first
place or borrow money from that lender. That understanding is, in
many instances, not a part of the promissory note and the accompanying security documents. It is, nevertheless, an integral part of the loan
agreement. The preclusion of testimony or course of dealing evidence

96. Lawrence, 761 P.2d at 645; Jones Land & Livestock Co. v. Federal Land Bank
of Omaha, 733 P.2d 258, 262 (Wyo. 1987).
97. Lawrence, 761 P.2d at 645; Jones Land & Livestock Co., 733 P.2d at 262.
98. This result is at least arguably inconsistent with the general trend of lender
liability cases across the country. See, e.g., Lawrence, 761 P.2d at 654 (Urbigkit, J.,
dissenting).
99. Wvo. STAT. § 34.1-1'205 (1990).
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to prove such an understanding provides lenders with a powerful tool
and raises a significant hurdle for borrowers to overcome. It enables
lenders to avoid potential liability through careful contract drafting
and other preventive measures."' It prevents borrowers from introducing evidence to contradict or alter the terms of the written documents even where the parties' conduct appears to indicate a different
understanding. The only means of circumventing the preclusion is
persuading the court that the parties' written agreement is either ambiguous or incomplete.' 1
B. Failure to Advance Additional Funds
When parties enter into a loan agreement, they may anticipate
the borrower's need for future financing. Accordingly, the agreement
may contain provisions regarding the advance of future funds. In the
typical situation, the security documents are drafted to include future
advances, if any. Problems arise when a lender decides, for whatever
reason, not to advance additional funds when requested by the borrower. The usual reason, of course, is that the borrower's need for additional funds indicates that the borrower is in financial difficulty and
advancing more funds is not a sound business decision. The borrower
usually has no alternative source of funds and suffers financial
collapse.
The key question in cases involving the failure to advance additional funds is whether the loan agreement makes such advances obligatory or permissive. An agreement which requires the lender to advance funds is enforceable. 10 2 An agreement which merely permits the
lender to advance additional funds is not enforceable.'
The language
of the documentation is critical. The use of the phrase "which may be
advanced" or similar language does not create an enforceable obligation."" Furthermore, the Wyoming Supreme Court will not rewrite
the plain language of a loan agreement "under the guise of interpretation,"' 5 even where the borrower offers evidence of a course of dealing
which indicates a contrary intent. Ambiguous documents may be supplemented, however, by evidence of the parties' course of dealing. 06
A lender's refusal to advance additional funds, even where op100. See in/ra notes 373-376 and accompanying text.
101. It is not inconsistent to allege that the parties to a short-term promissory
note had an understanding that the note would be renewed. Nor is it inconsistent to
allege the existence of other provisions, such as an agreement to provide partial releases of collateral in exchange for certain actions by the borrower. Where the borrower's understanding is reasonably based on the representations or actions of the
lender or where the parties have established a course of dealing which confirms the
alleged understanding, such evidence should be admissible.
102. Lawrence, 761 P.2d at 646.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 645.
105. Id.
106. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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tional, is also circumscribed by the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.' 7 As a result, the bad faith refusal to advance funds may
be actionable even in the absence of an obligation to advance such
funds.' 8
C.

Termination of a Line of Credit

Businesses need operating capital. They often acquire the necessary capital by establishing a revolving line of credit. The borrower is
permitted to draw on that line of credit, up to the maximum, as necessary."0 9 There may come a time, however, when the lender learns or
believes that the borrower is in such financial trouble that allowing
the borrower to draw up to the authorized credit limit will be throwing good money after bad. The line of credit is terminated and future
draws are refused. Properly done, the termination of a line of credit is
not actionable. Improperly done, it may lead to significant lender
liability.
The issue in the termination of lines of credit cases is notice.
With proper notice, the termination is not actionable. Without proper
notice it is.
The seminal case, which has been widely followed, is K.M.C. Co.,
Inc. v. Irving Trust Co." K.M.C. had a $3.5 million line of credit
secured by all its assets. Without advance notice, the lender refused to
advance $800,000, which would have brought K.M.C. near its borrowing limit. K.M.C. was unable to obtain alternative operational financing and quickly collapsed.' K.M.C. sued for breach of the agreement
to provide a line of credit. A jury returned a verdict of $7.5 million,
which was affirmed on appeal."' The Sixth Circuit found that every
contract, including a financing agreement, contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." 3 That covenant imposes a duty
of reasonable notice in terminating an ongoing financing agreement."'
Therefore, a line of credit may not be terminated unless the lender
provides the borrower with advance notice of intent to terminate financing and a reasonable opportunity to obtain alternative
financing."'

107. See infra notes 121-130 and accompanying text.
108. Id.
109. Although there are similarities, a line of credit is not the same as an agreement to make future advances. The former is generally structured to permit the borrower to obtain financing, up to the credit limit, upon the unilateral act of the borrower. The latter usually requires some affirmative act by the lender.
110. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
111. Id. at 754.
112. Id. at 766.
113. Id. at 759.
114. Id.
115. Id. The court cited comment 8 to section 2-309 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which imposes a reasonable notice requirement when a business relationship is
terminated.
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In determining whether the lender has acted in good faith, its
conduct should be measured by "objective standards.""' That is,
there must have been some objective basis upon which a reasonable
loan officer could have determined that the lender is insecure, and
that a reasonable lender would not advance additional funds under
the circumstances."' In the absence of a reasonable basis for believing
the lender to be insecure, thereby justifying the termination of the
line of credit, the question becomes whether the lender's bad faith
refusal to advance additional funds prevented the borrower from obtaining alternative financing. 1 8 If so, that refusal to advance funds is
actionable. If not, there is no causation, meaning that the lender's bad
faith did not cause the borrower any damages and hence is not
actionable.
While the Wyoming Supreme Court has not considered a line of
credit case,1' 9 the K.M.C. decision is in line with the Wyoming decisions holding that there is an implied covenant of good faith
1 20 and fair
dealing in loan agreements which limits the parties' rights.
D.

Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing

The Uniform Commercial Code imposes an obligation of good
faith in the "performance or enforcement" of all contracts subject to
its terms.'2 ' "Good faith" means "honesty in fact.""'2 The implied obligation of good faith has been extended to the relationship between a
lender and a borrower. 23 The recognition of that implied duty means
that a cause of action exists when that duty is breached. It is unclear,
however, whether such a breach gives rise to a contract action or
whether there is an independent tort action. The Wyoming Supreme
Court has, without comment or explanation, affirmed a lower court
decision finding the evidence insufficient to support claims of bad
faith in contract or tort, thereby appearing to recognize an independent tort action." It seems unlikely, however, that the court intended
to or will recognize an independent tort action if directly faced with
that issue.
The court has recognized a separate, but limited tort of breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing in the context of a first-party

116. Id. at 761.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 763.

119. Lawrence v. Farm Credit Sys. Capital Corp., 761 P.2d 640 (Wyo. 1988) involved the failure to advance future funds, rather than an operational line of credit.
120. See infra notes 121-130 and accompanying text.
121. WYo. STAT. § 34.1-1-203 (1990) (U.C.C. § 1-203).
122. WYo. STAT. § 34.1-1-201(a)(xix) (1990).
123. Sturman v. First Nat'l Bank, 729 P.2d 667, 677 (Wyo. 1986); Garner v. Hickman, 709 P.2d 407, 411 (Wyo. 1985).
124. Lawrence, 761 P.2d at 651.
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insurance claim. 1' Writing for the majority in a three to two decision,
Justice Urbigkit found that insurance contracts are "one of those special classes of contracts" where there is an independent duty of good
faith and fair dealing. 1 2 The majority's primary concern appears to
have been the disparate bargaining power between an insurer and an
insured. 27 In dissent, Justice Thomas expressed the concern that by
adopting a first-party bad faith cause of action the court "may have
adopted it for all contractual relationships."' 28 Justice Golden, also in
dissent, took the position that since the duty of good faith and fair
part of an insurance contract, there can be no
dealing is an integral
29
independent tort.
There is merit in the argument that some lending relationships
involve significantly disparate bargaining positions and the resulting
loan agreements are, therefore, within the same "special class" of contracts as insurance contracts. It appears unlikely, however, that the
court will recognize an independent tort of breach of the duty of good
faith in lender liability cases. 130 Justices Thomas and Golden have already expressed their opposition to any such extension. Furthermore,
the cases on which the majority relied in McCullough are first-party
insurance cases.
E. Equitable Estoppel
The doctrine of equitable estoppel'13 is a traditional means of
proving the existence of a contract when the party against whom enforcement of the contract is sought denies its existence. The purpose
of the doctrine is to prevent injuries caused by one party's good faith
reliance on another. 132 The effect of equitable estoppel is to preclude a
defendant that knows the truth from denying a material fact which
was used to induce the plaintiff to change his position where the
plaintiff was ignorant of the facts and reasonably relied upon the representations of the defendant."2 3 Generally, estoppel will not apply
where the parties were equally well informed about the material facts

125. McCullough, 789 P.2d at 858.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 861 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 863 (Golden, J., dissenting).
130. The primary significance of whether a claim for breach of the duty of good
faith is a contract or a tort claim is the standard for punitive damages. In contract
cases, punitive damages are recoverable only if there was "fraudulent misconduct" at
the inception of the contract. United States v. Redland, 695 P.2d 1031, 1039-40 (Wyo.
1985). Punitive damages are available in a tort case upon a showing of "wanton or
willful misconduct." McCullough, 789 P.2d at 860-61.
131. The Wyoming Supreme Court has also recognized the "closely related doctrine" of promissory estoppel. Inter-Mountain Threading, Inc. v. Baker Hughes Tubular Services, Inc., No. 90-139, slip op. at 5 (Wyo. S. Ct., June 10, 1991).
132. Kincheloe v. Milatzo, 678 P.2d 855, 862 (Wyo. 1984).
133. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 27 (1966).
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or had equal access to discover them.13 4 The doctrine may be very
useful in proving the existence of an agreement to lend money or some
particular term or terms of that agreement. It has been applied in
Wyoming in a lender liability case.135
Equitable estoppel exists in a lender liability context if: (1) the
borrower (the party asserting estoppel) lacks knowledge of certain material facts and is without means to discover those facts; (2) the lender
knows those material facts; (3) the borrower relies in good faith on the
actions or inactions of the lender; and (4) the borrower is damaged as
a result of that reliance. 136
In Roth v. First Security Bank, a developer sought to establish a
line of credit.13 7 He engaged in discussions with various bank officers
about the proposed loan. After preliminary indications that the bank
would provide credit, the bank refused to finalize a loan agreement.
The developer sued, arguing that the bank was estopped from denying
the existence of a loan agreement. Although the court recognized the
applicability of the doctrine, there was no equitable estoppel because
the borrower was familiar with the lender's loan practices and policies
and could not have reasonably relied on the preliminary representations of bank officers.
Reasonable reliance is the key. Equitable estoppel is most likely
to exist where the borrower is unsophisticated, has limited access to
information, and has developed a long-term relationship with a lender
in which the borrower consistently relies on the lender for advice, or
where there is a well-established course of dealing between the parties
on which the borrower reasonably relies.' 38
F.

Waiver of Default

Waiver of default has become one of the most common, and most
successful, bases for lender liability suits. The argument is simple. A
lender waives its right to insist on strict compliance with the loan
agreement by overlooking prior defaults."3 9 The most common scenario is that the lender has habitually accepted late payments. The
lender finally declares a default and takes collection action. The borrower defends and counterclaims, alleging that the lender's actions in
accepting late payments represent a modification of the loan agreement. The lender's decision to declare a default is, therefore, a breach
of the modified contract.
134. Kincheloe, 678 P.2d at 862.
135. Roth v. First Sec. Bank, 684 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1984).
136. Id. at 96; see also Zimmerman v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 848 F.2d
1047, 1053-54 (10th Cir. 1988).
137. 684 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1984).

138. See, e.g., Zimmerman, 848 F.2d at 1053-54.
139. Default is defined by the loan agreement, not by law. See infra notes 363-366
and accompanying text.
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In Foothill IndustrialBank v. Mikkelson, the Wyoming Supreme
Court appeared to recognize the general rule that a lender's acceptance of late payments or acquiescence in other deviations from the
terms of a loan agreement may constitute a waiver of strict compliance with those terms. 40 The court went on to say that a lender's
acceptance of late payments "does not necessarily" waive the right to
insist on strict compliance in the future and to declare a default for
future delinquent payments."' It appears, therefore, that the court is
in step with the majority of jurisdictions across the country which recognize that a lender's actions may represent a waiver of the lender's
right to declare a default and proceed with collection or forfeiture.
Where there has been a waiver, virtually any action by the lender
to accelerate and collect the debt will lead to liability. The lender may
not insist on strict compliance or declare a default until the waiver
142
has been cured by notice of intent to insist on strict compliance.
V.

TORT THEORIES

The great transformation in lender liability law over the last decade has been the move from a purely contractual relationship between
a lender and a borrower to one where each party has certain non-contractual duties to the other because of some special relationship." ' As
a result of these additional duties, there have arisen corresponding
remedies in tort. Numerous tort theories have been recognized in
lender liability cases. Many are traditional tort causes of action.
Others are of more recent origin. The following discussion considers
those tort claims which the Wyoming Supreme Court has either
adopted or rejected in lender liability cases, as well as those which
have received significant attention in other jurisdictions.
A.

Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

The Wyoming Supreme Court has not recognized, and appears
unwilling to recognize, an independent tort action for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing except in first-party
insurance cases."4 Instead, an action for bad faith involving a lender
is derivative of and should be brought in conjunction with an action
140. 623 P.2d 748, 754 (Wyo. 1981). The court went on to find, however, that
while the bank's acceptance of late payments without objection may have waived the
borrower's default for failure to make timely payments, the bank had not waived the
borrower's failure to timely pay assessments and remove encumbrances on the property. Id. at 754.
141. Id. at 756.
142. See infra note 376 and accompanying text.
143. That special relationship may arise either by the express or implied agreement of the parties or be imposed by law. See supra notes 61-89 and accompanying
text.
144. See supra notes 121-130 and accompanying text.
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for breach of contract. 40
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The formation of a fiduciary relationship imposes certain obligations on both parties, the breach of which is actionable."" A lender
which has a fiduciary relationship with a borrower has a number of
duties. Those duties include: (1) not profiting at the borrower's expense without the borrower's consent; 147 (2) not disclosing confidential
information; " 8 (3) disclosing all material information which the lender
knows or should know; 49 and (4) not lending the borrower more
money than he or she can reasonably be expected to repay.' 0 Stating
that the breach of a fiduciary relationship is actionable, however, begs
the question. Is there a fiduciary relationship between a borrower and
a lender?
The existence of a fiduciary relationship between a borrower and
a lender has never been recognized in Wyoming. Nor is there any indication that the court will recognize such a relationship.' 5' It is unlikely, therefore, that the tort of breach of fiduciary duty will provide
the basis for a successful lender liability claim in Wyoming.
C. Breach of the Peace
In the event of a default, the Uniform Commercial Code permits
a secured party to repossess collateral "without judicial process if this
can be done without breach of the peace . ... "152 If there is a breach
of the peace, acting without judicial process may lead to liability. The
critical question is what is a breach of the peace? The Wyoming Supreme Court recently addressed that
issue in Salisbury Livestock Co.
15
v. Colorado Central Credit Union. 3
George Salisbury III ("young Salisbury") borrowed money from
the Colorado Central Credit Union in Denver, Colorado (where he
lived). The loan was secured by four automobiles owned by young Salisbury. He subsequently defaulted on the loan. The Credit Union sent
notice of default to young Salisbury's mailing address, and, having received no response, hired a repossession company to repossess the vehicles. The repossessors found and repossessed one vehicle at young
Salisbury's Colorado residence. They then travelled just over the state

145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Morfeld v. Andrews, 579 P.2d 426, 433 (Wyo. 1978) (recognizing in
passing an action for breach of fiduciary duty). See also A. BLOOM, supra note 5, at 37.
147. A. BLOOM, supra note 5, at 37; A. CAPPELLO, supra note 4, at 116-18.
148. A. BLOOM, supra note 5, at 37.
149. Id.; see also A. CAPPELLO, supra note 4, at 112.2.
150. A. BLOOM, supra note 5, at 37; see also Meyers (No. 10147), supra note 2.
151. See supra notes 25-57 and accompanying text.
152. WYo. STAT. § 34.1-9-503 (1990).
153. 793 P.2d 470 (Wyo. 1990).
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line into Wyoming to look for the remaining vehicles on the property
of the Salisbury Livestock Company, a family corporation operated by
young Salisbury's father, George Salisbury, Jr. Early in the morning,
the repossessors entered the property of the Salisbury Livestock Company via a private road, located two of the vehicles and towed them
away.'" No attempt was made to obtain permission to enter the property or to tow the vehicles. 165 Salisbury Livestock Company then sued
the Credit Union and the repossessors for trespass and breach of the
peace. The trial court granted a directed verdict and Salisbury appealed. 156 The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a
5
"
new trial."
The court read the self-help statute narrowly "to reduce the risk
to the public of extrajudicial conflict resolution."' 58 Accordingly, the
entry onto the property of another to repossess collateral pursuant to
the self-help statute is permissible only if it can be done without
breaching the peace.'" Whether the peace has been breached depends
on "the potential for immediate violence and the nature of the premises intruded upon."'' 60 These factors are related because the potential
for immediate violence increases as the creditor's trespass comes
closer to a dwelling.' 6' The facts of each case must be evaluated using
the "reasonableness" criterion of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 198.162
On the one hand, a trespass, alone, is not necessarily unreasonable. 163 On the other hand, the absence of a confrontation does not
make the trespass reasonable."' The determinative question is
whether there was "[tihe possibility of immediate violence.'" 1 1 The
court focused on two elements which it found could lead a reasonable
jury to find a breach of the peace: (1) the entry was onto the premises
of a party not privy to the loan; and (2) the entry was into the "sethe vehicles sought
cluded ranchyard of an isolated ranch where
166
[were] not even visible from a public place."

154. In dissent, Chief Justice Cardine also noted that the repossessors "broke a 2
x 4 board." Id. at 476 (Cardine, C.J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 471-72 (Golden, J., writing for the majority).
156. Id. at 471.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 473.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 474 (quoting Cottam v. Heppner, 777 P.2d 468, 472 (Utah 1989)).
161. Id.
162. Id. "One is privileged to enter land in the possession of another, at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, for the purpose of removing a chattel to the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
immediate possession of which the actor is entitled ...
TORTS § 198 (1964).
163. Salisbury, 793 P.2d at 474-75.
164. Id. at 475.
165. Id.
166. Id. Rural residents, according to the court, have a greater "privacy expectation" than urban dwellers. Id.
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The court's emphasis on the intrusion onto the property of a
third party and the greater privacy expectations of rural residents
substantially limits the applicability of the decision. While it is unlikely that the decision will provide the basis for a successful lender
liability suit in most instances, lenders are well advised to keep a tight
rein on the activities of repossession companies.
D.

Conversion

The tort of conversion is one of the oldest forms of civil recovery.1" 7 It has been, however, successfully adapted to lender liability
cases. Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over another's
property.168 There is no requirement of actual wrongful possession;
any wrongful denial of property rights is a conversion. 6 9 The most
likely acts of conversion in a lender-borrower relationship are the
lender's wrongful repossession and disposition of collateral, the
lender's improper
setoff or a refusal to surrender repossessed
170
collateral.
The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld a judgment in favor of a
borrower and against a lender based on conversion in Western National Bank of Casper v. Harrison.'71 In Harrison, the borrower defaulted on a promissory note secured by a mobile home. The lender
foreclosed on the collateral and issued a "repossession title" to an accommodation party that paid off the note. 172 The borrower successfully sued the lender and the accommodation party, alleging, inter
alia, that the actions of the lender in disposing of the collateral without proper notice under the Uniform Commercial Code were a conversion. 173 The trial court found the lender liable for conversion and entered judgment
for the borrower. i7' The judgment was affirmed on
71
appeal.
It is clear, therefore, that a lender which unlawfully interferes
with a borrower's property rights before or during repossession and
foreclosure is guilty of conversion. 7 6 A lender's actions in derogation
of a borrower's rights under the Uniform Commercial Code are an unlawful interference with that borrower's property rights. 177 In order to
discourage conversion, the measure of damages for a willful or bad
faith conversion is either "the benefit received by the tortfeasors" or
167. W.

KEETON,

supra note 13, § 15.

168. Western Nat'l Bank v. Harrison, 577 P.2d 635, 640 (Wyo. 1978).

169. Id. at 690.
170. A. CAPPELLO, supra note 4, at 207.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

577 P.2d 635 (Wyo. 1978).

Id. at 637.
Id. at 639-40.
Id. at 637-38.
Id.
Id. at 640.
Id.
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the "rule-of-thumb" damages provided by Wyoming Statutes section
34-9-507(1) ("not less than the credit service charge plus ten per cent
of the principal amount of the debt or the time price differential plus
that fails to prove actual
10 per cent of the cash price"). 178 A plaintiff
17 9
damages is entitled to nominal damages.
E.

Defamation

A defamatory statement is one which "tends to hold the plaintiff
up to hatred, contempt, ridicule or scorn or which causes him to be
shunned or avoided; one that tends to injure his reputation .. .
Liability exists only if the statement is false and is published, either
orally or in writing, to a third party. Truth is an absolute defense.' 8 '
Defamation includes both oral statements (slander) and written statements (libel). Defamation claims are common in lender liability cases,
and in Foothill IndustrialBank v. Mikkelson, the Wyoming Supreme
Court considered a claim of libel brought by a borrower against a
lender."2
The plaintiffs in Foothill borrowed money which was secured by a
real estate mortgage. The bank declared a default s ' and elected to
foreclose on the property by advertisement and sale.' 84 The borrowers
attempted to cure by making several payments, but the lender proceeded with the foreclosure. After the foreclosure, the borrowers sued,
alleging that they had been libeled by the bank's publication of a foreclosure notice when there had either been no default or, if there had
been a default, the lender had waived the default. 8 ' The trial court
found there was no default and awarded compensatory damages of
$2,500, and punitive damages of $500.' On appeal, the judgment was
reversed. 87 The Wyoming Supreme Court found that there had been
a default. Because truth is a complete defense, there had been no libel
since the publication was truthful. 8 8
Actions by a lender to foreclose or collect a loan invariably involve the publication of information which is likely to have an adverse
178. Id. at 641-42.
179. Id.
180. Tschirgi v. Lander Wyoming State Journal, 706 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Wyo. 1985).
181. Id. at 1120.
182. 623 P.2d 748 (Wyo. 1981).
183. The bank claimed that payments were not timely, property taxes and assessments on the mortgaged property had not been paid, the property was not properly
insured and judgment liens against the property had not been released. Id. at 753-54.
184. Id. at 751-52.
185. Id. at 758. The borrowers also alleged abuse of process. The court found
there could be no abuse of process where there was a default which entitled the lender
to assert its remedies, including a foreclosure proceeding. Id. at 757. The court also
suggested that an advertisement and sale foreclosure does not involve the use of "process" within the meaning of that tort. Id.
186. Id. at 750.
187. Id. at 758.
188. Id.
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effect on the borrower's reputation. The crucial question is whether
the information is true, i.e., has there been a default. 8 ' If so, the
lender has nothing to fear. If there has been no default or if the default has been waived, 9 collections activities, which are invariably
public, may result in lender liability for damaging the good name or
reputation of the borrower. 1 '
F.

Duress

Duress is a traditional defense to a contract action, excusing nonperformance by the party asserting duress. 92 At least one court, however, has recognized duress as an independent tort.' 3
Duress, as a defense to a contract action, exists where: (1) the
party seeking relief from the contract has been induced; (2) by the
unlawful act of the other party; (3) to perform or refrain from performing some act under circumstances which deprive him or her of
free will.' 94 The normal remedies are rescission or restitution, not
damages. 95 The defense of duress in an action by a lender to require
performance by a borrower has one significant limitation. It is not duress for one party to insist upon that party's legal rights, even to the
detriment of the other party.196 That insistence may, however, be subject to the obligation to act in good faith.'9 7
In the Farah case, 9 8 duress was recognized as an independent
tort cause of action, rather than simply as a defense in a contract enforcement action. The borrower was found to have acted under a form
of duress known as "business compulsion" created by the lender. 99
The borrower's imminent financial distress and the absence of practical alternatives to the action insisted upon by
the bank combined to
'20 0
create the actionable "business compulsion.
The Farah court's recognition of the "tort" of duress is an aberration. It is, perhaps, best explained as a creative method of evading the
absence of an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing in
189. Whether there has been a default is determined by the agreement between
the parties. See infra notes 363-366 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983) (affirming a
judgment in favor of plaintiffs in a defamation action based on wrongful repossession
which was made public).
192. See, e.g., A. CAPPELLO, supra note 4, at 183.
193. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 682-84.
194. In re TR, 777 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Wyo. 1989) (citing SKMD v. SLM, 652 P.2d
974 (Wyo. 1982)).
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 376 (1979).
196. Id. § 176 comment e.
197. See supra notes 121-130 and accompanying text.
198. 678 S.W.2d at 682-84.
199. Id. at 686-87.
200. Id.
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Texas lender liability law.2 °1 There is no reason to expect the Wyoming Supreme Court to accept duress as an independent tort, particularly since the court has held that the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing applies to the relationship between a borrower and a
lender.20 Duress is likely to, and should, remain a defense in a contract action. It may arise in a lender liability case where the borrower
seeks to be relieved from the provisions of an allegedly onerous loan
agreement.
G.

Fraud

Fraud in a lender liability case encompasses a broad spectrum of
conduct from deliberate misrepresentation to very subtle failure to
04
Perhaps
disclose information.2 3 It may be actual or constructive.
because of its flexibility, fraud is the most common cause of action
asserted in lender liability cases.2" The tort of fraud has been expressly recognized in Wyoming in a lender liability case.20 '
Fraud is conduct that is "obnoxious to good morals."20 7 It consists
of: (1)a false representation made by the defendant to induce the
plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (2) which representation the
plaintiff reasonably believes; and (3) relies upon to his detriment.210
The tort of fraud has several unique aspects. First, the normal rules of
pleading2 09 do not apply. Instead of "notice pleading," the circumstances constituting fraud "shall be stated with particularity." ' Second, fraud will not be imputed where the facts are "consistent with
honesty." ' Finally, fraud must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.2"
Actual fraud consists of some action done by a lender with the
intent to deceive the borrower, such as making a false promise to advance funds in the future in order to induce the borrower to pledge
additional collateral. 213 Intent to deceive is not necessarily, however, a
201. See Herndon v. First Nat'l Bank, 802 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991),
reh'g denied (holding no duty of good faith and fair dealing unless it is "intentionally
created by express language in a contract or unless a special relationship of trust and
confidence exists between the parties to the contract").
202. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
203. A. BLOOM, supra note 5, at 18; A. CAPPELLO, supra note 4, at 94.
204. A. BLOOM, supra note 5, at 19; A. CAPPELLO, supra note 4, at 95.
205. A. CAPPELLO, supra note 4, at 94.
206. Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Air Freight, Inc., 773 P.2d 911, 919
(Wyo. 1989).
207. Zanetti v. Zanetti, 689 P.2d 1116, 1124 (Wyo. 1984) (citing Otte v. State, 563
P.2d 1361, 1364 (Wyo. 1977)).
208. Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433, 437 (Wyo. 1985).
209. Wvo. R. Civ. P. 8(e).
210. Wyo. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see also Reed v. Owen, 523 P.2d 869, 871 (Wyo. 1974)
(plaintiff must allege fraud "clearly and distinctly").
211. Duffy, 708 P.2d at 437.
212. Id.
213. The promise of future financing in exchange for additional security is a com-
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prerequisite to recovery for fraud. The breach of fiduciary duty"" has
been held to be constructive fraud in those jurisdictions which have
recognized a fiduciary relationship between a borrower and a
lender. " '
One of the common allegations by a borrower is that the lender
has failed to disclose material information. Ordinarily, silence is not
actionable as fraud.21 6 Where there is a special relationship, however,
the lender has a duty to disclose information.2 17 Where there is a duty
to disclose material information, silence may constitute fraud.2 18 In
addition, a party who, without such a duty, decides to speak, must
speak the truth.21 9 Similarly, half the truth may be a lie. 2 '
The duty to disclose information is a continuing one. Accordingly,
where one party has made a statement upon which the other party is
known to be relying, and the party that made the statement subsequently acquires information which makes the statement untrue or
misleading, there is a duty to correct the original assertion.2 '
Although fraud is a "natural" claim in a lender liability case, its
attractiveness is significantly reduced by the requirement that fraud
be proved by clear and convincing evidence.222 Clear and convincing
evidence in a fraud case is that which will "satisfy the mind and conscience of its existence .... ,,223 Facts which would permit a jury to
decide either way using a preponderance of evidence standard may be
insufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard.2 4 Because the
facts which give rise to a potential fraud action may also support an
action for negligent misrepresentation, which need only be proven by
a preponderance of the evidence, " ' a 2borrower
should also consider a
26
claim for negligent misrepresentation.

mon allegation in lender liability cases. A. BLOOM, supra note 5, at 18; A. CAPPELLO,
supra note 4, at 97.
214. See supra notes 25-57 and accompanying text (discussion of whether a fiduciary relationship exists).
215. A. BLOOM, supra note 5, at 19.

216. Id. at 20.
217. See supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text (general discussion of lenderborrower special relationship and implied duties which arise therefrom).
218. Meeker v. Lanham, 604 P.2d 556, 558-59 (Wyo. 1979); Steadman v. Topham,
800 Wyo. 63, 81, 338 P.2d 820, 826-27 (Wyo. 1959).
219. Meeker, 604 P.2d at 559.
220. Twing v. Schott, 80 Wyo. 100, 113, 338 P.2d 839, 843-44 (1959).
221. W. KEETON, supra note 13, at 738.
222. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
223. Reed, 523 P.2d at 871.
224. Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, Puryear (No. C88-1012-B) at 8
[hereinafter Summary Judgment Order, Puryear].
225. See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
226. See infra notes 274-285 and accompanying text.
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H. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Wyoming Supreme Court has adopted the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46.227 The court has also recognized the tort in a
lender liability case.22 1 Intentional infliction of emotional distress consists of: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2)
that intentionally or recklessly; (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress. 2 9 Liability extends to "bodily harm" resulting from
the distress.2 30 The key elements are "outrageous conduct" and "severe" emotional distress.
"Outrageous conduct" is that "which goes beyond all possible
bounds of decency, is regarded as atrocious, and is utterly intolerable
in a civilized community."2 "' "It is for the court, in the first instance,
to determine whether the defendant's conduct is so outrageous as to
permit recovery ...."I" Outrageous conduct is difficult to prove in a
lender liability case because a lender's efforts to collect on a promissory note pursuant to the loan agreement and in accordance with the
law are, as a matter of law, not outrageous. 23 3 Accordingly, such conduct will be outrageous only where the lender acts in contravention of
the loan agreement or the law.
Emotional distress "includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment,
anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry and nausea. ' 23 " Liability only
arises, however, where such distress is "so severe that no reasonable
man could be expected to endure it."' 3 5 The court is to determine
whether on the facts alleged severe emotional distress can be found.23 '
The "severity" standard is very difficult to meet in a lender liability
case as the typical emotional distress suffered by borrowers has been
deemed not "serious."
The loss of a job which causes lost sleep and worry about the
future is not severe; rather, it is "the kind of distress with which the
ordinary person must be expected to cope. '2 3 7 Similarly, a borrower's
loss of his life savings, life's work, pride and trust in others is not
227. Leithead v. American Colloid, 721 P.2d 1059, 1065-66 (Wyo. 1986).
228. Sturman, 729 P.2d at 680 (affirming the trial court's determination that

there was insufficient evidence of serious emotional distress).

229. Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1065.
230. Id. "Bodily harm is any impairment of the physical condition of the body,
including illness or physical pain." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 comment b

(1977).
231. Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1066.
232. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment h (1964)).
233. Sturman, 729 P.2d at 680.
234. Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1066 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
comment j (1964)).
235. Id. at 1066 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1964)).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1067.
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"severe," even where it causes the recurrence of an ulcer and high
blood pressure.2 8 Because of the difficulty in proving "outrageousness" and "severity," a borrower in a lender liability case is unlikely
to get a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress to a jury,
let alone obtain a judgment and prevail on appeal.2 39
L

Intentional Interference With Contract or Prospective Advantage

There are three possible claims based on a lender's interference
with the business or business relationships of a debtor: (1) intentional
interference with contract; (2) intentional interference with prospective advantage; and (3) intentional interference with the borrower's
performance of a contract. The Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized the first two causes of action and rejected the third.
1. Intentional Interference With Contract
The tort of intentional interference with contract consists of: (1)
an existing contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) of
which the defendant has knowledge; (3) intentional interference with
that contract by the defendant which causes a breach by the third
party; and (4) damages as a result of that breach.24 The Wyoming
2 1
Supreme Court has recognized this tort in a lender liability case.
Interference, even if intentional, is not actionable unless it is improper.2 4 2 The key elements are intent and improper interference.
Intent exists if the defendant acts with the purpose of interfering
with the contract, even if there is some other purpose, or if the defendant knows that the interference "is certain or substantially certain" to occur as a result of his actions.4 An action which is incidental to the defendant's primary purpose is, therefore, potentially
actionable.
Commercial borrowers, almost by definition, have contracts with
third parties. Accordingly, the acceleration and foreclosure of a defaulted loan will often cause a third party to terminate a contractual
relationship with the borrower. That interference is not actionable,
however, unless it is improper. It is often not improper for a lender to
238. Summary Judgment Order, Puryear at 12 (granting summary judgment to
the lender on borrower's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); see also
Sturman, 729 P.2d at 680.
239. Borrowers in other jurisdictions have recovered damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., A. BLOOM, supra note 5, at 36. The distress
which provided the basis for recovery included insomnia, tension and anxiety, symptoms which have been expressly rejected in Wyoming. See, e.g., Leithead, 721 P.2d at
1065-68; Summary Judgment Order, Puryear at 11-13.
240. First Wyoming Bank v. Mudge, 748 P.2d 713, 715 (Wyo. 1988) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977)).
241. First Wyoming Bank v. Mudge, 748 P.2d 713 (Wyo. 1988).
242. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 comment a (1977).
243. Id. § 766 comment j.
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act when a borrower is in default. Where a borrower is attempting to
sell property which is subject to a security interest, it is not improper
for the secured party to interfere with that sale by obtaining a court
order commanding the sheriff to stop the sale and take possession of
the collateral.244 Such "interference" was pursuant to a court order
and in accordance with the terms of the security agreement between
the parties and was not, therefore, improper.24 The measure of damages in an action for intentional interference with contract is the
amount which will compensate the4 6plaintiff for all of the detriment
proximately caused by the breach.1
If there has been an improper interference, the plaintiff may simultaneously maintain an action for breach of contract against the
breaching party and an action for intentional interference
2 47 against the
party whose improper interference caused the breach.
2. Intentional
Advantage

Interference

With

Prospective

Contractual

The absence of a contract does not necessarily preclude recovery.
A defendant may be liable for intentional interference with a prospective contractual relationship. Such interference is actionable if the defendant induces or otherwise causes a third party not to enter into or
continue a prospective contractual relationship with the plaintiff, or if
the defendant prevents the plaintiff from acquiring or continuing a
prospective relationship with a third party. 48 The Wyoming Supreme
Court has never considered the applicability of the tort in a lender
liability action, but
allowing such a claim would be consistent with the
2 9
court's decisions. 4
The elements of the tort are similar to those for intentional interference with contract. There must be: (1) an existing "business expectancy;" (2) of which the defendant has knowledge; (3) intentional interference with that expectancy by the defendant which causes a
termination of the expectancy by the third party; and (4) damages as
a result of the disruption of that expectancy. 50 Such interference
must be "without justification [and] creates liability for the harm
caused thereby." 51 The tort is intended to protect the "probable ex-

244. Sturman, 729 P.2d at 680.
245. Id.
246. Texas West Oil & Gas Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 726 P.2d 1056, 1064 (Wyo. 1986)
(citing Martin v. Wing, 667 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1983)).
247. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 comment v (1977).
248. Martin v. Wing, 667 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Wyo. 1983) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1977)).
249. Martin v. Wing, 667 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1983). Martin involved an action by
property owners against neighbors for interference with a prospective sale of their
property.
250. Id. at 1162 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 (1939)).
251. Id. at 1161.
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pectancies" of life.2 52 The measure of damages is those which will
compensate the plaintiff for all the damages proximately caused by
the breach of the expectancy."' 5
The business relations protected against intentional interference
include "any prospective relations, except those leading to contracts
to marry."' 54 It is not necessary that the business expectancy will be
reduced to a formal contract. An actionable expectancy may include
"quasi-contractual or other restitutionary rights or even the voluntary
conferring of commercial benefits in recognition of a moral obligation."2 55 The intent element is satisfied if the defendant desires to interfere with the plaintiff's business expectancy or if the defendant
knows that his
actions are substantially certain to cause improper
256
interference.
The primary issues in such an action are proving the business expectancy and the defendant's knowledge of that expectancy with sufficient specificity. The existence of an expectancy is typically proven
through showing a course of dealing between the parties.2 57 Whether
the defendant had knowledge of the expectancy is a factual
determination.2 8
3. Intentional Interference with Another's Performance of His
Own Contract
The Restatement recognizes a cause of action where a defendant
intentionally interferes with a plaintiff's contract with a third party
and causes the plaintiff's performance of that contract to become
more expensive or burdensome. 59 The Wyoming Supreme Court has,
however, rejected such a cause of action.2 60
Price v. Sorrell is a case which probably should never have been
brought. Daniel Price was hired by Riverton Memorial Hospital
(RMH) to collect a delinquent debt. Larry Sorrell was hired by the
debtor to represent her. Sorrell wrote a letter to the RMH questioning
Price's reputation, denying that his client owed the debt and inviting
RMH to sue, if it so desired. Price subsequently sued Sorrell, alleging
that the letter had damaged his relationship with RMH and had
252. Id. (quoting W. PROSSER,

LAW OF TORTS, § 130 (4th ed. 1971)).
253. Id. at 1163 (citing Douglas Reservoirs Water Users Ass'n v. Cross, 569 P.2d
1280 (Wyo. 1977)).
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B comment c (1977).
255. Id.
256. Id. comment d.
257. Martin, 667 P.2d at 1162.
258. Id. at 1163.
259. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 766A (1977). See also Colorado Interstate
Gas v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 661 F. Supp. 1448, 1469 (D. Wyo. 1987), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 885 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1989) (predicting that the Wyoming
Supreme Court would adopt § 766A).
260. Price v. Sorrell, 784 P.2d 614 (Wyo. 1989).
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caused him to incur expenses of $117 to repair the relationship.2 61 He
sought $25,000 in damages to the relationship and punitive damages.
The action was based on section 766A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, intentional interference with another's performance of his own
contract 2 6 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Sorrell because the alleged interference had neither caused an actual
breach nor had it imposed a "substantial expense or burden upon the
[p~laintiff." 83 Price appealed, arguing that he did not have to show an
in finding
actual breach of contract and that the district court erred
that there must be a "substantial expense or burden. '"264
The Wyoming Supreme Court chose to restrict its review to
whether it should adopt the tort of intentional interference with another's performance of his own contract as set forth in section 766A.
The decision produced three opinions: a "majority" opinion by Chief
Justice Cardine; a special concurrence by Justice Thomas, joined by
Justice Golden; and a specially concurring opinion by Justice
Urbigkit.2" 5 While all five members of the court voted to affirm the
trial court's summary judgment in favor of Sorrell, only three agreed
to reject section 766A. 211 The court rejected section 766A of the Restatement, even though it had previously adopted sections 766 (intentional interference with contract) and 766B (intentional interference
with prospective advantage), because permitting recovery where there
has been no breach and only more expense or burden would permit an
element of proof that "is too speculative and subject to abuse to provide a meaningful basis for a cause of action."2 7
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Golden, was of the opinion that
the case was not a section 766A case at all because the facts did not
support such a claim.2 8 Since the court was addressing the issue of
section 766A, however, Justice Thomas argued that there is no logical
reason to permit recovery under section 766 or 766B and not allow
recovery under section 766A. To be consistent, the court should either
adopt section 766A or reject sections 766 and 766B.2"' What the court
did, concluded Justice Thomas, was "whimsical and capricious. 2 70
There is merit in Justice Thomas' concurrence. Nevertheless, a
261. Id. at 615. The damages were incurred to produce recorded telephone conversations of cases involving collections on behalf of RMH and to make telephone and
personal contact with RMH employees to respond to the allegations made by Sorrell.

Id.

262. Id.

263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 616.
266. Id. Chief Justice Cardine and Justice Macy rejected the tort in the majority
opinion. Justice Urbigkit concurred with Chief Justice Cardine and Justice Macy that
section 766A should be rejected. Id. at 619 (Urbigkit, J., specially concurring).
267. Id. at 616.
268. Id. at 616-17 (Thomas, J., specially concurring).
269. Id. at 618.
270. Id. at 616.
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majority of the court has rejected section 766A. Perhaps a case arising
out of an interference which caused more substantial damages would
have reached a different result, although there is nothing in the opinions of Chief Justice Cardine or Justice Urbigkit to suggest that the
amount of the plaintiff's costs would make a difference. There is little
likelihood, therefore, that a borrower will succeed in recovering from a
lender under section 766A.
J.

Negligence

The tort of negligence is well-established in Wyoming."' It consists of a duty and a breach of that duty which proximately causes
harm to the plaintiff. 7 2 In lender liability cases, the threshold question is whether the lender owes the borrower any duty, the breach of
which will lead to tort liability. That depends on the nature of the
relationship between lender and borrower. 27 The nature of the relationship varies, depending on the specific facts of each case.
At least three different types of negligence claims have been
brought against lenders, with varying degrees of success: negligent
misrepresentation, negligent advising and negligent lending. In addition, there is good authority to support a claim for negligent breach of
contract. Although all negligence claims share the same underlying elements, each has unique characteristics.
1. Negligent Misrepresentation
Whether regarded as a separate tort or simply as another negligence claim, negligent misrepresentation has been alleged successfully
by borrowers in lender liability cases. It offers a substantial advantage
to the plaintiff over a claim for fraud.2 '
The elements of negligent misrepresentation are: (1) false information supplied by the defendant in the course of the defendant's
business for the guidance of the plaintiff in his business; (2) the failure by the defendant to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or relating the information; and (3) pecuniary loss proximately caused by the
plaintiff's justifiable reliance on the false information.27 5 The failure
to disclose material information may constitute negligent misrepresentation if the lender has a duty to disclose such information.27 6
Negligence of any sort hinges upon the existence of a duty. The
existence of a duty depends on the relationship between the borrower

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

See, e.g., McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).
Id. at 411.
See supra notes 25-62 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 284-285 and accompanying text.
Dully, 708 P.2d at 437.
W. KEETON, supra note 13, at 738.
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and the lender.2 7 Since the standard for proving negligence is a preponderance of the evidence, rather than clear and convincing evidence, the duty and the corresponding scope of liability is more limited. Accordingly, recovery is restricted to the party for whose benefit
and guidance the information was provided, and limited to the loss
caused by that party's reliance on the negligent misrepresentation.17
Liability for negligent misrepresentation exists only if the defendant intended or knew the borrower would rely on the representation. 27 9 The reason is that the recipient of "commercial information"

cannot reasonably expect that the supplier of the information observed a duty other than the duty of honesty unless the supplier of
the information knew that the information would be put to a particular use by the recipient of the information. 280 Therefore, the scope of
actionable conduct is narrow.
Despite the narrow scope of actionable conduct, a borrower is entitled, at a minimum, to expect that a lender will exercise the "care
and competence" which the lender professes to have simply by engaging in the business of lending money.2 1' A lender that participates in a
specialized area of lending, such as agricultural lending, must adhere
to the standard of care that participation in that particular area implies. 2 82 In addition, the nature of the relationship
between the parties
283
may lead to an even higher standard of care.

When contrasted with a fraud claim, an action for negligent misrepresentation presents the plaintiff with a significant advantage and
a significant disadvantage. The advantage, to the borrower, of negligent misrepresentation over fraud is the lower standard of proof required. Negligent misrepresentation must be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence.2 84 Fraud must be proven by the higher
standard of clear and convincing evidence. 285 The disadvantage of

negligent misrepresentation is the narrower scope of actionable
conduct.
2. Negligent Advising
One of the more recent developments in lender liability has been
277. See supra notes 25-57 (the duty may result from a special relationship) and
see infra notes 299-312 (a duty may result from a contractual relationship).
278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1976).
279. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976) (the borrower and lender
are sufficiently analogous to the buyer and supplier in a commercial transaction to
make this comment applicable).
280. Id. comment a.
281. Id. comment e.
282. Id.; see also Order on Motion to Amend, Puryear,supra note 62, at 10-11.
283. Order on Motion to Amend, Puryear, supra note 62, at 10-11.
284. Id. at 11; see also Landmark Bank v. McGlinn, 684 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (E.D.
Mo. 1988).
285. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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the recognition of a cause of action for negligent advising."' As with
all negligence actions, a claim for negligent advising is dependent
upon the lender's having a duty to advise.
A lender's duty to advise a borrower may arise in two situations.
First, under traditional negligence principles, a lender that gratuitously renders advice assumes an obligation to provide sound advice. 287 Second, the existence of a special relationship between the
lender and the borrower may give rise to an obligation to proffer advice; that advice, of course, must be sound. 8 Unless the lender has or
assumes a duty to give sound advice, the failure to render sound advice, or the failure to give any advice, is not actionable, provided the
lender acts in good faith.
A lender which offers advice to a borrower assumes the duty to
render sound advice. This duty is a logical outgrowth of the rule that
one who voluntarily undertakes to render services to another "which
he should recognize" as necessary for the protection of the other is
subject to tort liability for physical harm that results from his failure
to exercise reasonable care." 2 89 The Wyoming Supreme Court recently
extended the traditional rule to cover a real estate salesman who gratuitously, but negligently, assisted an acquaintance. 29 Liability was
expanded beyond physical harm to include pecuniary loss.""' There is
no reason for the court not to extend liability to a lender that voluntarily, but negligently, advises a borrower.
In the absence of an assumption of duty, the duty to proffer
sound advice has been found to exist where: (1) the lender participates in a specialized field of lending and the standard of care expected of such lenders includes the duty to render sound advice; or (2)
there is a special relationship between the parties.
A lender that chooses to participate in a specialized area of lending does so at its own risk. Participation in a specialized area imposes
additional duties, which may include the duty to offer sound advice.2 92
The reason is that lenders involved in certain types of lending have
traditionally become closely involved with their borrowers' businesses,
advised borrowers about financial and business matters, and exercised
significant control over the course of a borrower's business operations. 93 Such involvement may give rise to generally accepted stan-

286. See, e.g., Vodak, 441 N.W.2d at 344; Order on Motion to Amend, Puryear,
supra note 62, at 10.
287. See, e.g., Kelly, 776 P.2d at 1019.
288. See, e.g., Vodak, 441 N.W.2d at 344; see also Order on Motion to Amend,
Puryear, supra note 62, at 10-11.
289. Ellsworth Brothers, Inc., 406 P.2d at 524 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 324A (1964)).
290. Kelly, 776 P.2d at 1019.
291. Id.
292. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
293. Id.
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dards of practice, which include an obligation to offer financial or business advice, particularly where the borrower is not financially
sophisticated and is relying on the lender for such advice, or where
the practice in the field is to offer such advice. The key, of course, is
whether there is a separate standard of care for participating lenders
that requires the lenders to offer advice. The standard of care must be
established through expert testimony.
Finally, a relationship of trust and confidence, developed over
time, often results in a lender becoming substantially involved in the
borrower's business.2 9' If the lender develops a pattern of advising the
borrower, and the borrower reasonably relies on that advice, that special relationship imposes on the lender a duty to provide sound
advice.
3.

Negligent Lending

A claim for negligent lending is, in a sense, a claim that one is
entitled to have one's cake and eat it, too. In essence, a borrower sues
a lender, alleging that the lender, which lent money to the borrower at
the borrower's request, was negligent in having done so. While it may
be that the lender is liable in negligence to its stockholders for failing
to exercise reasonable care in lending money, it is counterintuitive to
argue that the lender had a duty not to lend the borrower money
do so, unless there is a fiduciary
when requested by the borrower2 to
e5
relationship between the parties.
Whether negligent lending is actionable in Wyoming is an unanswered question. 29 6 Those appellate courts which have addressed the
question have uniformly rejected a cause of action for negligent lending.29 7 Given the trend against recognizing the claim, and the Wyoming Supreme Court's general antipathy toward imposing additional
liability on lenders, it seems very unlikely that the court will recognize
a cause of action for negligent lending.29
294. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 25-57 and accompanying text.
296. As discussed above, the jury in Meyers (No. 10147), supra note 2, found that
there was a fiduciary relationship between the parties, and that the lender had
breached that relationship by convincing the borrower to borrow more money than the
borrower could repay in order to obtain additional collateral.
297. See, e.g., Gries v. First Nat'l Bank, 82 Wis. 2d 774, 264 N.W.2d 254, 256-57
(1978); see also A. BLOOM, supra note 5, at 34.

298. Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized a variety of other negligence
claims brought against lenders, including negligence by the lender in processing loan

applications, loan administration, loan supervision, disbursement of funds, supervision
of loan and damage to property during foreclosure. A. BLOOM, supra note 5, at 33-35;
A. CAPPELLO, supra note 4, at 190-203. None of these has been considered in Wyoming.
However, all involve traditional concepts of negligence and should be cognizable as
general tort actions.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1991

39

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 26 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 8
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

4.

Vol. XXVI

Negligent Breach of Contract

Negligence is based on the existence of a duty. That duty may
arise by operation of law or by contract. 9"9 While the breach of a contractual duty normally results only in an action for breach of contract,
there are occasions where the breach of contract may result in tort
liability. Although there is no Wyoming case law involving a claim for
negligent breach of a contract to lend money, the principles enunciated by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Brubaker v. Glenrock Lodge
International Order of Odd Fellows appear to apply in a lender liability action.300
Brubaker involved an action by a tenant to recover from a landlord for personal injuries. The tenant had leased premises to be used
as a store. Pursuant to an agreement with the tenant, the landlord
remodeled the property. The remodeling included moving and installing a flight of stairs. Several months after taking possession of the
premises, the tenant was injured when the flight of stairs collapsed. 30 1
Tenant sued, alleging that the remodeling had been negligently
done.320 In upholding a jury verdict in favor of the tenant, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that tort liability "may arise ... by virtue
of a contract ...."303 Conduct that is "merely a breach of contract is
not a tort. 3 0 4 The question is whether the contract creates a relationship which "demand[s] the exercise of proper care ... ."35 If so, liability exists where the breaching party fails to use ordinary care to
avoid foreseeable injury. 6 In Brubaker, the duty to use ordinary care
arose because the landlord knew or should have known when it agreed
to remodel the premises that the failure to
use ordinary care in so
30 7
doing presented a foreseeable risk of harm.
It is well-established, therefore, that the breach of a contractual
duty which causes physical harm is actionable in tort if the contractual relationship between the parties imposed a duty to use ordinary
care.30 8 The issue in a lender liability case is whether the breach of a
contractual duty which causes economic harm may be asserted as a
tort claim.
There is no general duty to use reasonable care to avoid intangible economic loss.30 9 However, where one party to a contract makes a
299. Brubaker, 526 P.2d at 58.
300. Id. at 52.
301. Id. at 53-54.
302. Id. at 53.
303. Id. at 58.
304. Id. (quoting Weeg v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 82 S.D. 104, 109, 141 N.W.2d 913,
916 (1966)).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 58-59.
307. Id. at 59.
308. Id.; see also W. KEETON, supra note 13 at 656-57.
309. W. KEETON, supra note 13, at 657.
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promise to the other which induces reasonable reliance, the promisor
is under a duty to prevent foreseeable harm to the promisee as a result of that reliance.310 This duty to prevent reliance damages is in
addition to the promissor's contractual obligation to perform on the
promise and creates tort liability.3 1 '
The principle of reliance fits well with the concept of lender liability. Where a lender has promised to advance funds, it is foreseeable
that the borrower will rely on that promise. That reliance may result
in injury to the borrower (and possibly third parties) if the lender
breaches its promise to provide funds. Accordingly, the lender has
both a contractual obligation to lend money and a tort duty to prethe duty to prevent
vent reliance damages. Therefore, the breach 3of
12
reliance damages should be actionable in tort.
V.

SUMMARY OF THEORIES OF RECOVERY

Although a borrower in a lender liability action has a plethora of
causes of action potentially available, the following offer the best possibilities of recovery in Wyoming: breach of contract, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional interference with contract or prospective advantage, negligent misrepresentation and negligent advising.
An action for breach of contract depends on the existence of an
agreement to loan money, either written or oral. If the agreement is in
writing and is unambiguous, it is likely to be upheld, and extraneous
evidence of the parties' intent will not be admitted to contradict the
written agreement. An ambiguous or incomplete agreement, by contrast, presents the opportunity for the plaintiff to submit evidence of
the course of dealing between the parties to show the parties' intent.
Such evidence is often critical to show that the borrower's understanding and expectations were reasonable.
An action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
ing goes hand in glove with an action for breach of contract. The
nant is implied in all agreements, including agreements to
money, and acts as a limitation on the otherwise unambiguous

dealcovelend
con-

310. Id. at 658.
311. Id.
312. An action for negligent breach of contract as a result of reliance damages
may be asserted as a claim of negligent misrepresentation. The difference between an
action for negligent breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation as discussed
above, see supra notes 274-285 and accompanying text, is the source of the duty. In
the former case, the duty arises from the contractual relationship. In the latter, the
duty arises because of some special relationship.
There is no conceptual reason that an action for negligent breach of contract cannot be based on the breach of an unwritten provision of a loan agreement. Therefore,
it can be argued that the negligent breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing should be actionable in tort, notwithstanding the apparent absence of an
independent tort of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
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tractual or statutory rights of a lender.
There are few commercial borrowers that do not have existing or
prospective contracts with third parties. Accordingly, any action by a
lender to foreclose will invariably interfere with such rights. If that
interference is improper for any reason, such as the breach of a contract with the borrower, an action for intentional interference will exist. Because existing or prospective contractual rights are pervasive in
the commercial world, there is almost inevitably a potential claim for
intentional interference in a lender liability suit.
Although the scope of conduct actionable as negligent misrepresentation is narrow, it encompasses several fairly common types of activities. For example, errors in loan documents and documentation, if
prepared by the lender, may qualify as negligent misrepresentations.
It is difficult for a lender to assert that it does not have a duty to
prepare and maintain accurate records. If those inaccuracies are material, and are relied upon by the borrower, there may be a negligent
misrepresentation.
Negligent advising, as negligent misrepresentation, depends on
the existence of a special relationship between the borrower and the
seller. A duty to disclose information or to give advice is most likely to
exist because the lender has assumed that duty, either expressly or
impliedly. It is difficult, if not impossible, for a lender not to offer
financial or business advice, particularly when a borrower starts to
have financial problems. There may be no other way for the lender to
try to protect its investment. The lender thus faces the choice of offering advice, and assuming the potential liability for rendering unsound
advice, or standing by and watching the business and the lender's
money go down the drain.
VI.

DAMAGES

Contract damages and tort damages vary. That variance makes
the borrower's decision of whether to proceed in contract or in tort a
very important one.
A.

Contract Damages

The general rule for contract damages is that the plaintiff may
recover "reasonably foreseeable damages that directly resulted from
the breach - that is, such an amount as would place him in the condition he would have been in if the other party had adequately performed the contract." 18 The nonbreaching party has the obligation, of

313. Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instructions 15.02; see also Robert W. Anderson
Housewrecking & Excavating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 681 P.2d 1326, 1333 (Wyo.
1984).
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course, to mitigate damages." 4 Damages for the breach of a contract
to lend money are, in most cases, limited to the additional costs incurred by the borrower in obtaining a similar loan from another
lender. 15 There is an important exception.
Where a lender "has reason to foresee" that the borrower will be
unable to obtain alternative financing, the lender may be liable for
lost opportunity costs, loss of security, or postponement of a profita31 6
ble project caused by the breach of an agreement to lend money.
The exception will apply in many lender liability cases since a lender's
decision not to advance funds is often based on a determination that
the borrower is in precarious financial condition. The lender knows
very well that the borrower is a poor financial risk and will be unable
to obtain alternative financing. Therefore, the exception to the general
limit on damages will often apply, assuming an enforceable contract.
In addition, contract damages may include lost profits3 1318and loss of
the use of property, provided such loss was foreseeable.
Contract damages do not end with recovery for pecuniary loss.
Damages for "emotional distress" may also be recoverable.3 9 Emotional distress damages may be recovered in a contract action if the
breach also caused bodily harm,32 0 if the contract is of such a kind
that severe emotional disturbance was a "particularly likely" result of
a breach, s2' or if the breach is accompanied by willful and wanton
32
conduct.
2 "Bodily harm" means "any impairment of the physical
condition. 3 2 Emotional disturbance is mental3 suffering
or emotional
2
distress, including fear, anxiety or humiliation.
Recovery for emotional distress resulting from the breach of a
contract which causes bankruptcy or "sudden impoverishment" of the
borrower is not compensable unless the lender knew such distress to
be a "particularly likely risk" of the breach.3 5 It is not difficult to
argue, however, that emotional distress is a particularly likely risk of
terminating financing for a sole proprietorship or family business, es314. Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 15.02.
315. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 comment e (1979).
316. Id.; Order on Motion to Amend, Puryear,supra note 62, at 17.
317. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(3) (1979) (court may exclude
damages for lost profits if "justice so requires in order to avoid disproportionate
compensation").
318. Id.
319. Emotional distress damages should not be confused with damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The former are parasitic to general contract
damages. The latter are based on the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and may be recovered in the absence of any other claim.
320. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1979).
321. Id.; Order on Motion to Amend, Puryear,supra note 62, at 18.
322. Smith v. Hoyer, 697 P.2d 761, 764 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
323. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1979) (requirement of bodily
harm to recover for emotional disturbance); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905
comments b-e (1977) (definition and discussion of bodily harm).
324. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 comments b-e (1979).
325. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 comment a (1977).
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pecially where the person or family has devoted a lifetime to the
business.
Similarly, emotional distress damages may be recovered for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.32' In the
absence of physical injuries, recovery is limited to severe emotional
distress which is "substantial or enduring as distinguished from trivial
'
or transitory."811
The Wyoming Supreme Court has not considered the recovery of
emotional distress damages as an element of contract damages. Such a
result does not seem unlikely, however, since the court has often
"
adopted the views of the Restatements, 28
and Judge Brimmer s '9 has
permitted the issue of emotional distress damages arising out of
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing to go to the jury.33
The recovery of punitive damages in a contract action is difficult.
Such damages are recoverable only if there was fraud in the inducement of the contract." ' Punitive damages are not available for an unjustified breach of contract."' 2 In addition, a lender that acts in good
33
faith under the advice of counsel is not subject to punitive damages.
Since most contract actions only involve a breach of the contract or
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, not
fraudulent inducement, punitive damages will generally not be
available.
B.

Tort Damages

A successful plaintiff in a tort action not involving personal injury
is entitled to recover such damages as will reasonably compensate him
for all damages proximately caused by the defendant.2 4 Tort damages
need not be proved with absolute certainty; the evidence need only be
sufficient to allow the jury to determine damages with "reasonable

326. Order on Motion to Amend, Puryear, supra note 62, at 17-18; Commercial
Cotton Co., Inc. v. United California Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 517, 209 Cal. Rptr.
551, 555 (1985) (damages for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury may
be recovered in a tort action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
327. Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d 517, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 555 (defining
transitory as that which occurs only briefly).
328. See, e.g., Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1065-66 (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 (1964) (intentional infliction of emotional distress)); Mudge, 748 P.2d at
715 (adopting RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977) (intentional interference
with contract)); and Martin, 667 P.2d at 1162 (adopting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 766B (1977)
(intentional interference with prospective contractual
advantage)).
329. Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Wyoming.
330. Order on Motion to Amend, Puryear, supra note 62, at 17-18.
331. United States v. Redland, 695 P.2d 1031, 1039 (Wyo. 1985).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Atlas Const. Co. v. Slater, 746 P.2d 352, 359 (Wyo. 1987).
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probability. '335 The major sources of tort damages in a lender liability
case are likely to be loss of use of the collateral and lost profits. 5"
337
The loss of use of real or personal property is compensable.
The measure of damages is the amount sufficient to compensate the
plaintiff for the loss of use of the property, but only for such time as is
reasonably required to obtain replacement property. " The borrower
must, in other words, mitigate damages.

Lost profits are recoverable if "proved by the evidence."33 9 Lost
profits must be proved with "reasonable probability."' 4 The evidence
required to prove lost profits with reasonable probability will depend
on the facts of each case. " The court should require the plaintiff to
furnish "the best proof available."' 42 Lost profits will not be denied
merely because a business is new, but the plaintiff must provide some
evidentiary basis for the computation of probable lost profits.3 43 Finally, the plaintiff is entitled only to the present value of future
losses.3 4
The plaintiff in a lender liability case may also be allowed to recover for bodily harm or emotional distress which results from negligence s45 or negligent misrepresentation. 3 " Bodily harm is "any impairment of the physical condition of the body, including illness or
physical pain. '"3 7 Bodily harm is compensable even in the absence of
pecuniary loss.3 48 Emotional distress need not be severe; it encom-

335. In Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 165 (Wyo. 1989), the
court adopted "reasonable probability," rather than "reasonable certainty," as the
standard for proving damages in a personal injury case. Although the court has expressed no opinion on the appropriate standard for a non-personal injury tort case, the
rationale of the holding in Hashimoto appears to apply to all t9rt cases, not just personal injury cases.
336. The plaintiff, of course, must take reasonable steps to mitigate damages. The
failure to do so will preclude recovery for those damages which could have been
avoided. Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 4.08.
337. Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 5.02.
338. Id.
339. Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 4.07.
340. In Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 563 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Wyo. 1977),
reh'g denied, 566 P.2d 219 (1977), the court held that future losses must be proved
with reasonable certainty. In Hashimoto, the court altered the standard in a personal
injury case to reasonable probability. Hashimoto, 767 P.2d at 167. The court's rationale, that "none of us can see into the future," applies with equal force to proving future lost profits. Id.
341. Bonham, 563 P.2d at 1385.
342. Id.
343. Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 4.07.
344. Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 4.05.
345. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (1977); Order on Motion to Amend,
Puryear,supra note 62, at 17.
346. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (1977); Order on Motion to Amend,
Puryear, supra note 62, at 18; see also Little v. York County Earned Income Tax
Bureau, 481 A.2d 1194, 1201-02 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
347. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 comment b (1977).
348. Id.
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passes fear, anxiety or humiliation.3 49 The recovery of emotional distress damages as part of a negligence claim should not be confused
with recovery of damages caused by the intentional infliction of emotional distress.350
Although the Wyoming Supreme Court has not expressly considered the recovery of emotional distress damages in a lender liability
action based on negligence, the concept of recovery for emotional distress has long been recognized in Wyoming.""' Such damages are permitted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 905, which the
court has already adopted regarding emotional distress caused by false
imprisonment.3 5 2 Finally, Judge Brimmer has permitted a jury to consider emotional distress damages caused by a lender's negligence and
negligent misrepresentation. 53
Punitive damages are recoverable in tort for "willful and wanton
conduct" by the defendant. 35 Willful and wanton conduct is an intentional act or omission done with "reckless disregard" of the consequences under such circumstances that the defendant knew or should
have known would "in a high degree of probability" cause harm to the
plaintiff.355 The measure of punitive damages is left to the jury, which
may consider the defendant's financial condition in fixing the amount
of damages.35 An award of punitive damages which "punishes unjustly or excessively" will not be upheld. 9 7
Finally, the Internal Revenue Code permits the exclusion from
gross income of "the amount of any damages received ... on account
of personal injuries or sickness."'3 58 Damages recovered for "tort or
tort type" claims are excludable; damages based on breach of contract

349. Id. comments d, e.

350. See supra notes 227-239 and accompanying text.
351. See, e.g., Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 678 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 1984) (permitting recovery for work-related stress under Workers' Compensation); Cates v.
Eddy, 669 P.2d 912 (Wyo. 1983) (allowing recovery for emotional distress caused by
malicious prosecution); Waters v. Brand, 497 P.2d 875 (Wyo. 1972) (permitting the
recovery for emotional distress caused by false imprisonment).
352. Waters, 497 P.2d at 877-78.
353. Order on Motion to Amend, Puryear, supra note 62, at 17.
354. McCullough, 789 P.2d at 860 n.11; Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instruction
4.06.
355. Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 4.06.
356. Id.
357. Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Wyo. 1981). A plaintiff seeking to
recover punitive damages faced a bifurcated trial. The court held that the plaintiff
must first make a prima facie case for punitive damages, which is submitted to the
jury. If the jury decides that punitive damages should be awarded, the plaintiff may
then present evidence of the defendant's financial status, after which the jury returns a
separate verdict awarding punitive damages. Id. at 1132.
In Meyers (Civ. No. 10147), supra note 2, the jury was asked to consider the appropriateness of punitive damages. The jury determined that punitive damages should
be awarded. Before evidence was presented on the defendant's financial condition, the
case was settled.
358. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1989).
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or injury to business or property are not.35 9 "Personal injuries" include both physical and nonphysical injuries."' Accordingly, damages
received as compensation for emotional distress or bodily injury may
not be taxable. In addition, "personal injuries" has been defined to
include injuries to one's personal or business reputation.3 1 It is not
clear whether punitive damages fall within the purview of section
104 (a) (2). ""'
VII.

DEFENSES

The defenses generally available in contract or tort actions apply
in lender liability cases as well. Two defenses deserve particular
attention.
A.

Default

Most lender liability cases arise either as counterclaims in a foreclosure action or as independent actions filed after a loan has been
accelerated and foreclosed. In either event, one of the first questions
will be whether there was a default.
Default is not defined by law. Instead, whether there has been a
default depends solely on the agreement between the parties. A typical security agreement defines default to include: failure to make
timely loan payments; failure to timely pay taxes or assessments on
the collateral; failure to keep the collateral adequately insured; failure
to keep the collateral free from liens or other encumbrances; or the
reasonable belief of the secured party that the prospect of payment of
any indebtedness secured by the collateral or the performance of the
security agreement is impaired.38 3 The mortgage or security agreement
invariably provides that the occurrence of any of the specified events
of default entitles the lender to accelerate the note and declare the
entire amount of the debt due and payable. The lender may then
elect 8" and pursue its remedies. 8 '
359. Morgan, Old Torts, New Torts and Taxes: The Still Uncertain Scope of

Section 104(a)(2), 48 LA. L. REV. 875, 882 (1988). It has been be argued that damages
resulting from actions such as tortious breach of contract are excludable from income.
Id. at 881.
360. Id. at 877.
361. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986). There remains, however,
significant disagreement about the applicability of section 104(a)(2) to damages recovered for damage to one's business reputation. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 359, at
901-03.
362. Morgan, supra note 359, at 918-30.
363. 19 AM JUR LEGAL FofMs 2D § 253:3411.

364. A lender often has more than one remedy, and is free to choose among them.
Foothill, 623 P.2d at 755-56. If, however, the collateral is real property, the lender may
not retain the property and seek a deficiency judgment. The lender is not entitled to a
deficiency until after the property has been sold, thereby fixing the amount, if any, of
the deficiency. Wagner v. Wyoming Production Credit Ass'n, 773 P.2d 927, 931 (Wyo.
1989).
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If a borrower is in default and the loan agreement so provides,
the lender is entitled to accelerate the loan and foreclose unless the
lender has waived the default. In the absence of a waiver, the only
questions which remain are whether the lender acted in good faith, in
accordance with the loan agreement, and pursuant to applicable laws.
If the default has been waived, the lender must cure the waiver before
proceeding. 6
B.

Comparative Negligence

The Wyoming comparative negligence statute applies to any action "to recover damages for negligence resulting ... in injury to person or property.

'3 7
6

The statute's applicability to a negligence action

is apparent. The question arises, however, of whether the plaintiff's
conduct will reduce recovery in non-negligence cases or in an action
based on both negligence and non-negligence claims.
Wyoming's comparative negligence statute has been narrowly
construed. It "applies only to causes of action arising out of appellee's
negligence." ' The statute does not reduce the plaintiff's recovery
where recovery is based on an intentional tort " 9 or willful and wanton
misconduct... since both involve conduct fundamentally different
than negligent conduct. Furthermore, comparative negligence does not
apply to claims based
on strict liability or breach of warranty, whether
3 71
express or implied

Since the statute specifically refers to actions for "negligence,"
comparative negligence principles do not apply to a recovery which is
based on both negligence and non-negligence claims where there is a
general verdict and the non-negligence claims will support the entire
365. If the collateral consists of real property, the lender may foreclose the mortgage pursuant to a judicial foreclosure or, if the mortgage so provides, foreclose by
advertisement and sale. If the collateral consists of personal property, the lender's
remedies are specified by the U.C.C. If the collateral is both real property and personal
property, the lender may foreclose the personal property pursuant to the U.C.C. and
proceed against the realty pursuant to the real estate mortgage foreclosure procedures,
or foreclose both the personalty and realty pursuant to the real estate mortgage foreclosure procedures. WYo. STAT. § 34.1-9-501(d) (1990).
366. See infra note 376 09
and accompanying text.
367. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-1 (a) (1988) (amended 1986). The statute diminishes the
plaintiff's recovery in proportion to the plaintiff's percentage of negligence unless the
plaintiff is more than fifty percent negligent, in which case the plaintiff recovers nothing. In addition, the 1986 amendments abolished joint and several liability. Therefore,
each defendant is liable only for its percentage of negligence. Id. at (d).
368. Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., No. 90-161, slip op. at 5 (Wyo. Feb. 21,
1991).
369. Bell v. Mickelsen, 710 F.2d 611, 617 (10th Cir. 1983).
370. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 194 (Wyo. 1979).
371. Phillips (No. 90-161), supra note 368 at 3. Contra Sheldon v. Unit Rig &
Equip. Co., 797 F.2d 883, 885-87 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding it is appropriate to apply
the Wyoming comparative negligence statute to reduce damages awarded for breach of
warranty).
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verdict. 7 Accordingly, if both negligence and non-negligence claims
are submitted to a jury, the lender ought to consider requesting a special verdict, requiring the jury to specify whether the damages are
based on negligence or non-negligence claims. Otherwise, it will be difficult to argue for any reduction in damages because of the plaintiff's
comparative negligence.
VIII.

PREVENTION

Although the lender liability pendulum may now be swinging
back toward lenders, 7 3 it is unlikely, and undesirable, that it should
ever swing back to the days when a lender was a mere provider of
money that owed only contractual duties to borrowers. Accordingly,
lenders should increase, not decrease their vigilance. As in every area
of law, a lender controls its susceptibility to liability through its practices and procedures. There are many common-sense steps which
lenders can take to reduce, if not totally eliminate, potential liability.
A.

Written Agreements

The era of doing business on a handshake is, and should be, gone.
Many lender liability cases have their genesis in differences of perception caused by the absence of written agreements. Without appropriate writings, the borrower's and lender's understanding of their loan
agreement will never be the same. The only questions are the degree
of difference and the reasonableness of those understandings. To
avoid creating misunderstandings which may lead to liability, the
complete loan agreement, not simply the loan documents, should be in
writing and signed by the parties. If there is an expectation that annual notes will be renewed provided certain criteria are met, there
should be an agreement setting forth the understanding and specifying the criteria. If there is nothing more than a one-year note which
will not be renewed, that, too, should be specified.
Loan officers have long had the practice of making notations of
significant conversations or contacts with borrowers, which are subsequently offered into evidence to prove the parties' understanding.
372. Order on Motion to Amend, Puryear at 3.
373. See, e.g., Kham & Nates Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th

Cir. 1990) (upholding the right of lenders to enforce the terms of a loan agreement
even where the action will force the borrower out of business); Penthouse Int'l Ltd. v.
Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan, 855 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988) (reversing a $128.7 million
verdict against a Virginia savings and loan for anticipatory breach of an agreement to
lend money to a hotel-casino project); Kruse v. Bank of America, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217,
235, 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 67, reh'g denied, review denied, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 870
(1988) (reversing a jury verdict of $47 million in compensatory and punitive damages).
The news for lenders is not, however, all good. See, e.g., THE NAT'L L.J., March 18,
1991, at 3, col. 1, at 32, col. 4 (jury verdict of $41.8 million compensatory damages and
$23.6 million punitive damages in favor of real estate developer and against Mellon
Bank for fraud).
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Often, however, the loan officer's entries are not shown to the borrower and may be self-serving. A lender has everything to gain, and
nothing to lose, by showing such notations to a borrower and obtaining the borrower's concurrence and a signature so indicating. Similarly, a lender has everything to lose by not disclosing such notations.
B.

Course of Dealing

The course of dealing between the parties is crucial. While the
Wyoming Supreme Court has, thus far, upheld the exclusion of evidence of the parties' conduct where the documents are unambiguous,
it is a simple matter for a court to find that the written agreement is
ambiguous or incomplete, thereby permitting the introduction of evidence of course of conduct. Just as the Wyoming Supreme Court has
upheld trial courts' discretion to exclude such evidence, it is likely to
uphold their discretion to receive such evidence. A lender is ill-advised to bank on the continued exclusion of evidence of course of dealing in the face of unambiguous documents.
Lenders ought not to be permitted to hide behind written loan
documents when the parties' reasonable understanding, based on their
course of conduct, is contradictory. While commercial lenders do, in
fact, generally write operational loans on an annual basis, there may
well be a long-term relationship between the borrower and lender
which gives rise to a reasonable expectation by the borrower of continued financing. Evidence of conduct which modifies a written agreement has been permitted in contract disputes;37 it ought to be admissible in lender liability cases.
This is not to suggest that a lender cannot terminate a long-term
relationship with a borrower. It may. Where that is going to happen,
however, each party must have a clear understanding of the other's
intentions, and the borrower must have a reasonable opportunity to
obtain alternative financing. Therefore, if only to protect itself, a
lender should provide reasonable notice of intent not to continue
financing.
C. Accuracy
In addition to the written loan agreement, lenders maintain voluminous records on each loan. Errors in loan documentation are a gold
mine for plaintiffs' attorneys, particularly when the borrower is not
financially sophisticated and is relying on a lender's presumed expertise to prepare loan documentation. Such errors are evidence of negligence and will destroy the favorable image that jurors may have of a
374. See, e.g., Huang Int'l, Inc. v. Foose Constr. Co., 734 P.2d 975, 978 (Wyo.
1987) (permitting the introduction of evidence that the parties to a written contract
had "habitually" disregarded its provisions, thereby resulting in a waiver of certain
provisions).
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lender, particularly a local lender, as a competent, secure repository of
their life savings.
Lenders must also carefully identify and bind the borrower, as
well as any guarantors. Many small businesses are incorporated,
meaning that the borrower is the corporation, not the individual who
acts on behalf of the entity. That individual may be an officer, director and the sole shareholder of the corporation. Nevertheless, the corporation, not the individual, is the borrower. While the loan to the
corporation may be contingent on a personal guaranty of the corporate obligation by the individual(s) that make up the corporation, the
lender must carefully document the identity of the borrower, the individual acting on behalf of the borrower, that such individual is authorized to bind the corporation, 7 5 and that the loan is guaranteed by
certain individuals in their individual capacities, not in their capacities as principals of the corporation. Having an individual sign a corporate obligation when he or she is not authorized to do so may relieve the corporation of liability, as will having that person sign in his
individual capacity. Similarly, a corporate officer or director who signs
a promissory note in his official capacity is not individually liable for
that obligation unless he also executes a personal guaranty. All loan
documentation, including security agreements, mortgages, workout
agreements and promissory notes, must be carefully drafted to accurately reflect which entity or individual is liable for what and in which
capacity. Furthermore, the collateral securing the loan must be accurately described and the security instruments filed promptly and
properly to preserve the lender's relative priority with respect to other
lienors.
D.

Reasonable Expectations

Lenders must be aware of how they hold themselves out to the
public. A lender which advertises itself as an expert in some area of
lending is likely to be, and ought to be, held to the standard of the
expert it purports to be. If a lender does not possess expertise or does
not intend to be held to an expert standard, it must take care not to
create expectations of expertise on which borrowers may reasonably
rely. Similarly, a lender may advertise that it will stick with borrowers
through good times and bad, creating the perception that it will not
terminate financing when the borrower has financial difficulties. That
perception may result in reasonable reliance by a borrower, and liability for the lender.

375. A lender should not enter into a loan agreement with a corporation until the
lender has received a certified copy of a corporate authorization to borrow which identifies the individual(s) authorized to borrow money on behalf of the corporation. There
is no other method for a lender to ensure that the individual who purports to have
authority to borrow actually has such authority.
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E. Borrower's Sophistication
Lenders must be aware of and take into consideration each borrower's financial sophistication. It is only good business not to lend
money to a borrower without knowing enough about that borrower to
form an opinion about his or her relative financial sophistication.
Having acquired that information, however, the lender must adjust its
conduct accordingly.
A lender which decides to extend credit to a financially unsophisticated borrower should know from the beginning that it may have to
offer advice or become involved in the borrower's business simply to
safeguard its investment. A well-timed piece of advice may save the
business-and the loan. By offering advice, however, the lender assumes the obligation to exercise reasonable care in rendering advice.
The failure to exercise such care may lead to liability.
A lender ought to encourage all borrowers to be represented by
counsel or other appropriate professionals. A lender ought to consider
not becoming involved with unsophisticated borrowers when there is
no one to look after the borrower's interests, unless the lender is prepared to enter into a special relationship with that borrower.
Finally, a lender which takes advantage of its attorneys or other
professionals in its dealings with an unsophisticated borrower is opening wide the door to a later claim of overreaching. It is simple, and
appealing, for a plaintiff's attorney to argue that the lender was so
concerned about its legal rights that it consulted counsel, but cared so
little for the rights of an unsophisticated borrower who placed his economic life in the bank's hands that it did not bother to advise the
borrower to retain an attorney. Accordingly, the lender should advise
the customer that he ought to obtain independent counsel. If the customer retains an attorney, the loan documentation should reflect that
involvement. If the borrower elects to proceed without representation
despite the lender's advice to retain counsel, and the lender decides to
proceed with the loan, the documentation should prominently state
that the lender has advised the borrower to retain counsel and that
the borrower has elected to proceed without an attorney.
F.

Full Disclosure

Disclosure is a two way street. Just as lenders expect, and deserve
complete disclosure from their customers, lenders must fully disclose
their intentions. A lender should have a clear, reasonable plan of how
it expects each loan to be repaid. It may be that the lender anticipates
that the loan will be renewed, rather than repaid, and has specific
goals for the borrower to achieve as a prerequisite to continued financing. The borrower should be fully apprised in writing of those expectations. If the repayment or renewal plan is not made known to the
borrower, he or she may have a totally different, and totally reasonahttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol26/iss2/8
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ble perception of the lender's expectations and intentions.
A lender's failure to fully disclose its intentions and expectations
may not only mislead the borrower into believing that all is well when
it is not, but later on force the lender to defend against the argument
that the lender had a secret plan to protect its interests at the borrower's expense. Complete, written disclosure will eliminate misperceptions on both sides.
If the borrower is not an individual, the lender must be careful to
deal with the appropriate individual(s). If the borrower is a corporation, the lender should communicate with the individual authorized
by the corporation to do business with the lender. If the borrower is a
partnership, the lender must not favor one partner over the other(s)
or deal with one partner to the exclusion of the other(s). Similarly, if
money is lent to more than one individual, the lender should keep all
joint obligors informed of the lender's intentions and expectations.
G.

Workout Plans

When a loan becomes a problem loan, the lender must have reasonable policies and procedures for developing a workout plan with
the borrower. Such a plan will not lead to liability provided it is developed in a timely, responsible manner.
A workout plan should be in writing and ought to contain specific, achievable goals and objectives, developed in consultation with
the borrower. The achievement or non-achievement of those goals and
objectives should lead to predetermined results. The only feasible
workout plan may be calling the loan when it is due and foreclosing
the collateral. That need not lead to liability. If the plan contemplates
the termination or nonrenewal of credit and the foreclosure of the collateral, the lender will not be liable provided the plan is developed in
sufficient time to allow the borrower a reasonable opportunity to seek
alternative financing.
H.

Cure Potential Waiver of Default

Lender liability claims based on the lender's waiver of the borrower's default are common. 76 They are also easily prevented. Curing
the waiver is a simple procedure which will eliminate the lender's potential liability for breaching a contract which has been modified by
the waiver.
Where a lender has not insisted on strict compliance with the
loan agreement from day one, the lender can cure any potential
waiver by providing notice to the borrower that the borrower is in
default, that the default must be cured within a reasonable, specified
376. See supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
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time, that the failure to cure the default will result in acceleration and
foreclosure, and that if the borrower cures the default, the lender will
insist on strict compliance henceforth. If the borrower fails to cure the
default, the lender may then proceed to accelerate the debt and foreclose at the expiration of the period specified in the notice. If the borrower does cure, the lender may not continue with the foreclosure, but
may insist on strict compliance henceforth.
The cost, to the lender, of curing a waiver is minimal; the lender
must wait until the end of the specified period before taking further
action. The cost of failing to do so may be significant.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Lender liability is here to stay. It has changed the way lenders do
business. Lenders, as doctors and lawyers, must, to some degree, practice preventive banking, with one eye on the potential for a lender
liability lawsuit. To some, that change has sounded the death knell of
banking as a profession, and the rise of banking as a business. To
others, the change is a badly needed realignment of the respective economic clout of borrowers and lenders. The truth lies somewhere in
between. Lenders should be aware of the long-term ramifications of
their actions. If those actions may lead to a lender liability suit, the
lender ought to adjust its conduct and practices accordingly, both for
its benefit and that of its borrowers.
Attorneys that represent borrowers now have at their disposal an
arsenal of powerful legal theories and precedents to take into battle.
Yet lenders in Wyoming should find solace in the Wyoming Supreme
Court's lender liability decisions. Those decisions do not provide a
reason for a well-advised lender to fear making loans. There is ample
protection for lenders that make loans prudently and pursue their
remedies reasonably. Only those lenders that do not act prudently and
reasonably need to worry about lender liability.
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